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ABSTRACT 
SUSAN L. COHEN: How to Accelerate Learning: Entrepreneurial Ventures Participating in 
Accelerator Programs 
(Under the direction of Christopher B. Bingham) 
 
This study uses theory building and theory elaboration methods to suggest how firms 
accelerate learning. Although prior research establishes that firms learn at different rates, less 
is known about how some firms, especially those in knowledge-based industries, accelerate 
learning. The research setting is nine accelerators—entrepreneurship education programs that 
accelerate learning during venture gestation. Since 2005, these modern incubators have 
offered cohorts of nascent firms seed financing, education, and mentorship during intensive 
three-month programs that culminate in high-stakes pitch presentations. Today, there are 
approximately 300 accelerators across five continents that have collectively helped 2500 
firms raise $1.8 billion in funding. Thus, accelerators are an important phenomena and an 
ideal setting to observe accelerated learning. There are several findings. First, learning is 
accelerated by mentor overload—time-compressed interactions with external advisors that 
delay implementation. Mentors expand strategic options. Second, learning is accelerated by 
director experts who rapidly accumulate and transfer expertise to nascent ventures. Directors 
narrow strategic options. Third, learning is accelerated by divided teams—founding team 
members who split up rather than band together during experience accumulation. Finally, 
learning is accelerated by cohort peers—peer ventures who are concurrently rivals and 
helpers. More broadly, this study contributes to organizational theory by bringing to light the 
central but heretofore hidden role of learning-coordination costs. This study also contributes 
iv 
to strategy by challenging the widely held assumption of time-compression diseconomies and 
to entrepreneurship by shifting the emphasis from changing strategic direction, often referred 
to as “pivoting,” to making strategic commitments. Finally this study contributes to 
entrepreneurship by pioneering academic research on the purpose and effectiveness of 
accelerators, explaining what they do and comparing them to incubators and angel investors.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Organizational learning, accelerated learning, entrepreneurship, 
accelerators, entrepreneurship education, learning-coordination costs, cohort peers 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Increasing the rate of organizational learning is the heart of a fast cycle-time strategy. To 
become a fast cycle-time competitor, it is essential that senior management embrace 
organizational learning as a strategic objective.” 
(Meyer & Purser, 1993) 
Organizational learning is central to strategy and organization theory (Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001; Zander & Kogut, 1995; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Thus it is no surprise that 
researchers have described many ways organizations learn, including from others 
(Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haunschild, 1993); experimentation (Pisano, 1994; Sitkin, 
1992); improvisation (Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001; 
Moorman & Miner, 1998); and doing (Argote, 1999; Arrow, 1962; Rapping, 1965). Despite 
the abundance of research on organizational learning, including several studies that find 
firms learn at different rates (Argote & Epple, 1990; Argote, 1999; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 
1995; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Lieberman, 1984; Pisano, Bohmer, & Edmondson, 2001; 
Reagans, Argote, & Brooks, 2005) and many that suggest how learning improves the 
production function (Adler & Clark, 1991; Argote & Epple, 1990; Benkard, 2000; Ittner et 
al., 2001; Levin, 2000), surprisingly few studies examine how firms accelerate learning.  
Organizational acceleration, however, is central to strategic management theory 
(D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Pioneering firms carve out 
favorable strategic positions with temporary or even sustainable competitive advantages 
(D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). First-
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movers erect barriers to entry by locking up strategic resources, such as limited supply and 
distribution channels, or establishing industry standards that favor their unique capabilities 
(Lynn, Skov, & Abel, 1999). Other firms use speed advantage to quickly imitate and then 
pass competitors(Hawk, Pacheco-De-Almeida, & Yeung, 2012; Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1998). By delaying implementation until after competitors identify winning strategies, these 
fast-following firms reduce risk and costly experimentation. Finally, faster product 
development is associated with lower costs and higher profitability (Clark & Fujimoto, 
1991).  
Considering the emphasis on acceleration in organizational research, in general, 
relatively few studies suggest how to accelerate learning. Extant work on accelerated 
learning largely suggests how firms improve production efficiency (e.g., Darr et al., 1995; 
Ittner et al., 2001; Lapré & Van Wassenhove, 2001; Terwiesch & Bohn, 2001). This stream 
of research examines how firms reduce production costs (Adler & Clark, 1991; Lapré & Van 
Wassenhove, 2001) or production time (Darr et al., 1995; Pisano et al., 2001). However, 
Argote (1999) notes that there are two types of learning: learning what to produce and 
learning how to produce it efficiently; much learning happens before the first unit is 
produced (Argote, 1999), including learning what to produce, when to begin production, and 
even whether to produce the first unit at all. Prior work on accelerated learning has focused 
more on learning how to improve production efficiency and less on how learning what to 
produce.  
However, much organizational learning is unrelated to production. Firms learn from 
acquisitions (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002), 
alliances (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998), and international entries (Bingham 
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& Haleblian, 2012; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). For example, Bingham and Haleblain 
(2012) found that firms learn heuristics from international entry experiences and Hayward 
(2002) found that firms learn more from prior acquisitions that are neither too similar nor to 
distant to focal acquisitions and result in small performance shortfalls. Although some 
studies (Hayward, 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002) suggest that time has an effect on 
learning, little work has been done to suggest how organizations might accelerate learning. 
In particular, there is little research on how firms accelerate learning during 
organizational gestation (Yang & Aldrich, 2012), yet learning during gestation might have a 
lasting effect on organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965). In a rare study of learning in 
entrepreneurial firms, Bingham and Davis (2012) examined nine late-stage entrepreneurial 
firms entering new international markets. They found firms that began by learning 
vicariously performed better over time. More generally, research suggests that organizations 
learn from others prior to developing their own experience (Argote, 1996). Though this work 
suggests that firms learn vicariously prior to market entry, it does not suggest how firms 
might accelerate such learning.  
This dissertation investigates how firms accelerate organizational learning. The 
research setting is seed acceleration programs (hereafter “accelerators”)—organizations that 
accelerate organizational learning during venture gestation by providing cohorts of nascent 
ventures with mentorship and formal education during temporally condensed programs. 
Given the state of theory related to accelerated learning and lack of empirical studies on 
accelerators, I use theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and theory elaboration (Lee, 1999) 
methods to investigate how organizations might accelerate learning.  
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This study makes several contributions. Principally, it contributes to organizational 
theory by highlighting the central but often overlooked role of learning-coordination costs. 
Firms expend learning coordination costs to set-up learning engagements. Because prior 
work typically begins with the learning interaction, it omits the time and effort expended 
prior to learning. This study also portrays a more nuanced view of vicarious learning. In 
particular, this study finds that firms learn “what” from heterogeneous groups with 
distributed expertise but learn “how” from homogenous groups with centralized expertise.  
This study also contributes to strategy by suggesting that accelerating learning 
reduces biases and improves learning. This conflicts with prior theory which suggests that 
learning diminishes when it is temporally compressed (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Levinthal & 
March, 1981). The ventures in this study accelerated learning by delaying implementation 
until they committed to a strategy, rather than beginning with learning by doing, as suggested 
by prior work (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 1994). This study also extends work on 
social learning by showing that ventures form aspirational groups with their cohort, even 
when cohort peers are in different industries.  
Finally, this study contributes to entrepreneurship research by initiating scholarship 
on accelerators, explaining what they do and evaluating their relative effectiveness. 
Moreover, this study suggests that entrepreneurs focus on committing to strategy rather than 
pivoting it (Ries, 2011). That is, rather than solely focusing on changing, entrepreneurs may 
want also to focus on making strategic commitments central to strategic management (Porter, 
1996).  
  
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter reviews prior work on organizational learning, time compression and 
organizational speed in order to set the theoretical setting for this study. I review prior work 
published in the organization studies, strategy, and entrepreneurship fields, and synthesize 
research related to organizational learning and speed. Throughout, I draw attention to 
concepts related to learning speed. I conclude with a discussion which includes opportunities 
for further research.  
2.1. Organizational learning  
This section discusses prior work on organizational learning. After defining key 
terms, I review some of the mechanisms firms use to acquire knowledge, including 
experiential learning (Argote, 1999), learning from others (Haunschild, 1993) by 
experimentation (Pisano, 1994), trial-and-error (Van de Ven & Polley, 1992), and 
improvisation (Miner et al., 2001). I conclude by synthesizing the research on organizational 
learning, highlighting opportunities for future research.  
(See Table 1 for calls for research and Table 2 for selected studies on organizational 
learning processes.) 
Accelerated Learning Definition  
As is customary in organizational learning research, I define organizational learning 
as a change in the range of an organization’s potential behaviors (Huber, 1991), routines 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988), cognition (Miner et al., 2001) or performance 
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(e.g., Argote & Epple, 1990; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Lieberman, 1984) due to processing of 
information or experience (Argote, 1999; Cyert & March, 1963; Fiol & Lyles, 1985, 1985; 
Huber, 1991). I also follow the behavioral view of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), which 
portrays learning as a process that “requires loops of stimulus and feedback, which trigger 
changes in performance and cognition” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985).  
Accelerated learning is organizational learning that happens faster than it would 
under typical conditions. (See “Accelerated Learning” in the methods section of this study 
for a description of how I measure accelerated learning.) 
2.2. Learning Modes  
Research on how organizations learn are germane to accelerated learning and include 
studies on learning by doing (Argote, 1999), from others (Haunschild, 1993), by 
experimentation (Pisano, 1994), by trial-and-error (Miller & Shamsie, 2001), and through 
improvisation (Miner et al., 2001).  
2.2.1. Experiential  
Early research on organizational learning showed that as firms accrue experience by 
producing more units (Lieberman, 1984) their performance improves. However, the rate of 
performance improvements diminishes over time, which produces “learning curves” 
(Rapping, 1965). Organizations within the same industry and even plants within the same 
firm learn at different rates (Adler & Clark, 1991). This empirical regularity has been found 
in several industries, including aircraft producers (Benkard, 2000), shipyards (Argote, 1996; 
Rapping, 1965), medical teams (Pisano et al., 2001), and service providers (Darr et al., 1995). 
Different measures of performance, such as production cost (Darr et al., 1995) and quality 
(Levin, 2000), produce similarly shaped learning curves. Empirical work in the learning 
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curve tradition generally assumes that learning happens when the production function 
improves (e.g., Adler & Clark, 1991; Ittner et al., 2001; Lapré & Van Wassenhove, 2001), 
though changes to the production function could be driven by factors unrelated to learning, 
such as decreasing raw material costs (Devinney, 1987).  
 
Table 1: Calls for Research 
Paper Gap Quote  
Pisano et al. 
(2001) 
Why firms have 
different learning rates  
“The first concerns the specific organizational and 
managerial factors that underlie the differences in 
learning rates that I observed . . .  much more in-
depth comparative work is required to draw more 
specific conclusions about the drivers of learning. 
An exploration of organizational-level differences in 
incentives, organizational processes, management, 
and practices is clearly warranted.”  
Perlow et al. 
(2002)  
Speed and 
organizational 
processes  
“How an emphasis on speed affects organizational 
processes remains unclear.”  
Huber (1991)  Field work on fast 
learning  
“The interesting finding that fast learning is 
sometimes disadvantageous (Levinthal and March 
1981; Herriott, Levinthal, and March 1985; 
Lounamaa and March 1987) seems plausible as 
developed and discussed by Levitt and March 
(1988), but the frequency and nature of this 
phenomenon deserve investigation in field settings.”  
Vermeulen and 
Barkema (2002)  
Diseconomies of time  “Diseconomies of time compression may be more or 
less prevalent under different circumstances”  
Huberman (2001) How does the model 
correspond to firm 
learning processes?  
“The existence of a learning curve for organizations 
has been thoroughly documented and studied since 
1936, but the underlying mechanisms that cause it to 
be a power law are still not clearly understood.” 
Lapre and Van 
Wassenhove 
(2001) 
What organizational 
structures and routines 
accelerate learning? 
“Further research is needed to better understand 
organizational structures and problem solving 
routines that allow firms to accelerate learning 
curves.” 
Aldrich and Yang 
(forthcoming) 
Can entrepreneurial 
firms learn fast 
enough? 
“Whether nascent entrepreneurs can learn fast 
enough during the startup process to avoid being 
selected out is a critical question for 
entrepreneurship and organization theory.” 
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Table 2:  Selected Studies on Learning Processes 
Article  Learning  
Type 
Research 
question 
Sample & 
DV 
Main concept  Gap related 
to speed 
Pisano et al. 
(2001)  
Learning-by-
doing 
Do firms 
learn from 
experience at 
different 
rates? 
660 cardiac 
surgeries at 16 
hospitals  
DV: Surgery 
procedure 
duration 
Hospitals learned at 
different rates.  
some firms learned 
more from similar 
amounts of experience.  
How did 
some 
hospitals 
learn more 
quickly?  
 
Miner et al. 
(2001)  
 
Improvisation How are 
improvisation 
and learning 
related?  
50 NPD 
meetings at 
established 
firms  
DV: Learning  
Improvisation is  
real-time, short-term 
learning that happens 
when strategic design 
and implementation 
converge in real-time.  
Does 
improvisation 
accelerate 
learning? 
How? 
Pisano 
(1994)  
Learning 
before doing 
(experiments) 
vs. Learning-
by-doing  
How do firms 
learn new 
routines?  
23 pharma-
ceutical and 
biotechnology 
process 
development 
projects  
DV: lead time  
Learning-by-doing is 
faster when low 
theoretical knowledge; 
learning before doing is 
faster when theoretical 
knowledge is high.  
When does 
learning 
before doing 
and learning-
by-doing 
accelerate 
learning?  
Van de Ven 
and Polley 
(1992) 
Trial and 
error 
How do firms 
learn by trial 
and error? 
A single bio-
medical 
innovation 
1983–1988  
Large firm 
Firms adapt when trials 
fall short of 
expectations. Trial-and-
error learning scant 
during expansion,  
found during 
contraction period. 
How can 
trial-and-error 
learning be 
accelerated?  
  
Haunschild 
and Miner 
(1997) 
Learning 
from 
others—
Vicarious 
Are different 
modes of 
vicarious 
learning 
independent? 
539 
acquisitions  
63 Investment 
banking firms  
 
Three types of 
vicarious learning: 
frequency, trait, and 
outcome. Differences 
between copying 
success and failure.  
Which 
modes, if any, 
can be 
accelerated? 
Haunschild, 
(1993) 
Learning 
from others - 
Vicarious 
Do firms 
imitate 
acquisition 
strategies 
observed via 
direct ties? 
327 firms 
with over 
$35M in 
revenue 
 
DV: number 
of 
acquisitions 
over $1M  
 
Outcomes affect 
likelihood of imitation. 
The amount of average 
premium paid by firms 
using a specific bank 
influences the 
likelihood of imitation.  
How do direct 
ties affect 
learning 
speed? 
Lapre and 
Wassenhove 
(2001)  
Experiment-
ation vs. 
learning-by-
doing  
Can firms 
accelerate 
learning with 
incomplete 
knowledge of 
production 
function?  
4 production 
lines in single 
manufacturing 
organization  
Formal learning via 
experimentation 
accelerates learning 
when knowledge 
diversity is high.  
How can 
firms build 
knowledge 
diversity? 
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Much research has investigated how to improve the production function either by 
reducing production costs (Adler & Clark, 1991; Lapré & Van Wassenhove, 2001) or 
production time (Darr et al., 1995; Pisano et al., 2001). Organizations improve production 
function in manufacturing settings by conducting training (Adler & Clark, 1991), making 
engineering changes (Adler & Clark, 1991), experimenting (Terwiesch & Bohn, 2001), 
increasing knowledge diversity (Lapré & Van Wassenhove, 2001), or improving quality 
(Ittner et al., 2001). Although important, this body of work has limitations. First, it omits 
early learning. For example, in their study of four steel wire production lines at a Belgian 
multinational corporation, Lapré and Van Wassenhove (2001) found that management buy-in 
and knowledge diversity improved formal learning resulting in productivity improvements. 
However, they did not examine learning that happened prior to production. Adler and Clark 
(1991) also investigated how to improve the production function. They found that 
engineering changes and employee training improve the production function either by 
reducing costs or by improving quality. However, they also do not address learning that 
happened prior to production. Thus, these studies are left truncated. Moreover, in some 
knowledge-intensive industries learning what to produce might be more important than 
learning how to produce efficiently. 
Other work has begun to investigate how some firms learn faster than others in non-
manufacturing settings. For example, Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson (2001) and 
Edmondson (2003) studied 16 hospitals whose cardiac surgery teams learned a new operating 
procedure. After finding that some of the surgery teams learned the new procedure more 
quickly than others, the authors conducted a post-hoc comparison between a fast- and a slow-
learning hospital to explore why some learned the new procedure more quickly. Compared to 
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the slow-learning hospital, the fast-learning hospital had a stable team that attended training 
together, had strong intra- and interdepartmental communication, planned, analyzed process 
and outcome data, and had a surgeon who encouraged input from team members. This study 
examined how operating teams learned an existing procedure. However, because the 
procedure itself was invented elsewhere, it is a study of accelerated learning of a known 
process, not an innovation.  
Prior work on accelerating learning-by-doing is limited to learning during production 
ramp-up, which results in process improvements. Less is known about how to accelerate 
earlier learning (including learning what to produce) or learning in knowledge intensive, non-
manufacturing industries.  
2.2.2. Learning from Others  
Another way firms learn is by observing others, sometimes called vicarious learning 
(Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haunschild, 1993; Huber, 1991). Scholarship on learning from 
others is rooted in individual social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) and studies of 
organizational imitation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Research shows that firms learn by 
observing alliance partners (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998), franchisees 
(Darr et al., 1995), industry peers (Zuckerman & Sgourev, 2006), or firms sharing board 
members (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001).  
There are several advantages to learning from others. Perhaps the most salient to 
acceleration is that firms can learn without the burden of “accumulating experience” (Ingram, 
2002), making learning from others widely available (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000) and 
relatively inexpensive (Ingram, 2002; Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Vicarious learning also 
expedites gathering heterogeneous information, because learners can observe many firms 
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simultaneously (Bingham & Davis, 2012). Heterogeneous information improves performance 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002) and expands learning by changing a firm’s range of potential 
behaviors (Huber, 1991). Cognitive limits to learning from heterogeneous experiences are 
higher when firms learn from other firms’ experiences than when firms learn from their own 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008).  
Learning from others accelerates learning prior to market entry (Bingham & Davis, 
2012; Darr et al., 1995; Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Haunschild, 1993; Huber, 1991). For 
example, Argote’s (1996) study of shipyards established that organizations learn vicariously 
prior to the start of production, which advances learning because firms can learn vicariously 
even before they create their own experience. Learning from others is faster when firms are 
related by a superordinate structure (Kane, Argote, & Levine, 2005). For example, Darr and 
coauthors’ (1995) study of 36 franchised pizza stores found that stores with the same 
franchisee ownership learned a novel pepperoni spreading technique faster than stores owned 
by other franchisors. Firms can also enhance vicarious learning by learning from 
geographically proximate competitors (Kim & Miner, 2007) and via social ties (Bell & 
Zaheer, 2007). Thus proximity, in general, seems to accelerate learning from others.  
Another way to improve learning from others is to plan to learn (Hamel, 1991; 
Khanna et al., 1998). For example, in his detailed qualitative study of nine international 
alliances, Hamel (1991) not only found firms that planned to learn from partners learned 
more, he also found firms that formed alliances with the intention to substitute external 
knowledge for a deficiency in internal knowledge learned less than firms that had an 
internalization or learning intent. Firms that lack foundational absorptive capacity may not be 
able to internalize the strategies of focal firms (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 
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2002). Khanna and coauthors (1998) expanded on Hamel’s notion of intent and found that 
partnering firms race to learn from each other. Racing increases the speed of learning when 
the partnering firm that completes learning first subsequently terminates the relationship. 
Although Khanna and coauthors (1998) found evidence that firms race to learn in alliances, 
they did not explain how some firms learn faster than their partners. Thus, like the research 
on learning curves, this research provides more evidence that firms learn at different rates but 
falls short of suggesting how firms might accelerate learning.  
Some research suggests that in turbulent or fast-paced markets vicarious learning can 
be slower than learning from experience, because observers need to wait for others to 
accumulate experience (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988) prior to constructing their own 
experience. Thus, although research suggests that firms might accelerate learning by learning 
vicariously, it also raises questions about whether learning vicariously is expeditious in 
uncertain markets.  
In sum, prior research has established that learning from others is most effective when 
it travels via direct ties to firms with adequate levels of absorptive capacity. Planning or 
intent further improves learning from others. Learning firms benefit from observing 
heterogeneous firms as well as firms with heterogeneous experiences. However researchers 
caution that vicarious learning can be incomplete, leading vicarious learners to undesirable 
outcomes (Denrell, 2003). Although much is known about learning from others, questions 
remain. Bingham and Davis (2007) note that some firms begin learning sequences with 
vicarious learning, yet research has not yet determined whether vicarious learning accelerates 
overall learning. That is, does learning from others enable firms to accelerate learning? 
Finally how might firms accelerate learning from others?  
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2.2.3. Experimental  
Like organizations that learn from others, organizations that learn from experiments 
can begin learning before creating their own direct experience. Firms learn from experiments 
by planning and conducting experiments and analyzing results (Miner et al., 2001). They test 
hypotheses about causal relationships by creating “contrasting situations in order to generate 
systematic experience” (Miner et al., 2001) sometimes using prototypes (Pisano, 1994). 
Inputs are deliberately varied, and the level of heterogeneity is controlled by the experimental 
design. Thus, planning, execution and analysis are central to experimental learning.  
Prior work suggests that experimental learning may help firms accelerate learning 
within a particular domain (Levitt & March, 1988) when two important conditions are met: 
First, learners must have a cogent theoretical understanding of their problem to hone in on 
key variables, otherwise experimental learning might progress more slowly (Pisano, 1994) or 
lead to proficiency in a sub-optimal specialty (Levinthal, 1997). Second, the laboratory 
setting must closely resemble the real environment or information garnered from a laboratory 
setting may not apply in the real environment (Pisano, 1994). Repeated shifting between 
laboratory and production settings improves organizational learning in general (Tyre & Von 
Hippel, 1997). Finally, experimentation is preferable when environmental conditions are 
relatively stable (Pisano, 1994, 1996). When the environment is turbulent, learning by doing 
is preferred (Pisano, 1994, 1996).  
Although some prior work seems to address the speed of experimental learning, it 
actually assumes that learning speed is fixed. For example, Pisano (1994) examined the 
elapsed calendar time (net of idle time) between the start and completion of process 
development projects and then proportionally attributed the amount of learning acquired 
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during each phase based on the amount of time a firm spends in each project phase—research 
and pilot. Thus, Pisano (1994) assumed that learning speed is fixed and that all modes of 
learning produce learning at the same speed. Using transportation as a metaphor, this is like 
calculating distance traveled based on travel time—regardless of whether you are traveling 
by plane or horse. If some modes of learning are more efficient, then elapsed time 
underestimates the amount of learning that occurs during a specified amount of time. Thus, 
further investigation is necessary to determine how experiments might accelerate learning.  
2.2.4. Trial and Error  
Firms also learn from on-line trial-and-error (Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Miner et al., 
2001). To learn by trial and error, firms repeatedly try strategies and  retain those strategies 
that generate performance that meets or exceeds their aspiration levels but shift to a new 
strategy when performance falls short of aspirations (Greve, 2003; Van de Ven & Polley, 
1992). Trial-and-error learning happens after a firm evaluates outcomes from attempted 
strategies. Moreover, firms use trial-and-error learning when they have their own 
experience—this distinguishes it from off-line experimental learning, which is available to 
firms prior to developing their own experience.  
Like other forms of learning, trial-and-error learning has limitations. For one, firms 
need to wait for feedback after each trial and then decide whether or not to retain the trial 
strategy. This sequential process can be laborious; when strategies fall short of aspirations 
firms only know which strategies to eliminate, not what strategy to pursue. Yet another 
limitation is that firms might not know the potential of a strategy when they first try it 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). As firms acquire experience with retained strategies, 
performance of those strategies will likely improve through learning from experience. When 
15 
firms compare the performance of a trial strategy with a retained strategy that has the benefit 
performance improvements garnered through experience, the performance of the trial 
strategy is likely to seem insufficient, because the trial strategy has not benefitted from 
experience (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988). Thus, learning from trial and 
error tends to favor retained strategies that have benefited from learning from experience.  
As firms learn from trial and error, they eliminate poorly performing strategies. Thus, 
firms must have a tolerance for failure. Even so, firms learn more from small shortfalls than 
from larger gaps, which can cause rigid responses, or large successes, which can reduce 
learning motivation (Hayward, 2002; Sitkin, 1992). However, learning iteratively from small 
losses might limit the speed of learning, because firms take only small steps toward desired 
outcomes. Even more, shifting to a new strategy resets the “learning clock back to zero,” 
further disadvantaging new strategies and delaying learning (Van de Ven & Polley, 1992: 
95).  
2.2.5. Improvisation  
Learning new strategies is not always intentional. Sometimes, firms spontaneously 
create and try new strategies, aptly named improvisational learning (Miner et al., 2001). 
Firms learn by improvisation when they try new strategies “on the fly,” often because they 
encounter constraints or uncover newly unfolding opportunities (Miner et al., 2001). To be 
considered improvisational, an activity’s design and implementation must happen nearly 
simultaneously. The primary difference between improvisational and other forms of learning 
is that an alternate strategy is implemented without advance planning.  
Because improvisational learning merges design with implementation (Moorman & 
Miner, 1998), it can be quick. Miner and coauthors (2001) observed that new product 
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development teams were more likely to use improvisational methods when they were under 
time pressure, further suggesting that firms may rely on improvisational learning when they 
do not have time to plan. Improvisation might accelerate learning because it reduces time 
spent in planning while still introducing new knowledge to the firm (Miner et al., 2001).  
Though improvisation requires unplanned changes to strategy, firms can nevertheless 
encourage improvisation. Miner and coauthors (2001) suggested that improvisational 
learning can be intentionally stimulated without specifying the content. That is, firms can 
develop routines that lead to improvisation even though the outcome of improvisation is 
unknown a priori. Firms foster opportunities for improvisational learning by improving 
communication (Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2003) and developing tolerance 
for cognitive reframing (Edmondson et al., 2003; Miner et al., 2001). Through rich 
communication, organizational members exchange tacit information that may unfold new 
opportunities for the firm. Moreover, when firms improvise, strong communication keeps 
other members in the team informed of new strategies, which reduces confusion (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000).  
Although researchers have suggested that firms rely on improvisation when they are 
under time pressure, we do not yet know how firms might accelerate improvisational 
learning. Research suggests there might be a tradeoff between speed and novelty: Moorman 
and Miner (1998) found that increases in procedural memory accelerated improvisational 
activities but reduced their novelty, while increases in declarative memory reduced the speed 
but increased the novelty of improvisational activities. How might firms use improvisation to 
accelerate learning yet not restrict the novelty of what is learned? 
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2.2.6. Learning Mode Discussion  
Empirical investigations clearly establish that organizations learn at different rates but 
rarely explore how some firms learn more quickly than others. Those studies that have 
examined how to accelerate learning tend to answer the question in terms of how to 
accelerate improvements in the production function, therefore concentrating on learning after 
the first unit is produced and omitting learning prior to production. Less is known about how 
to accelerate learning related to inventing new products and in knowledge-intensive 
industries.  
Much of the literature on learning speed simply compares the speed of learning-by-
doing to another type of learning—e.g., vicariously or experimentation—to identify the faster 
mode (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Pisano, 1994). Generally, this research finds that when 
uncertainty is high, learning-by-doing is faster, but when firms have a high theoretical 
understanding of the market, then experimentation might be faster (Pisano, 1994). This 
stream of research assumes that the speeds of different learning modes are fixed;  rather than 
suggesting how to accelerate learning, work that compares learning modes generally assumes 
that learning speeds are constant. Thus, my research question is: How might firms accelerate 
learning?  
2.3. Time Compression  
2.3.1. Time Compression Diseconomies  
Foundational work on organizational learning favors slow, rather than fast, learning 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Levinthal & March, 1981; Levitt & March, 1988). A widespread 
assumption in the literature is that, due to time compression diseconomies, the amount of 
organizational learning absorbed diminishes as it is temporally compressed. For example, 
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Dierickx and Cool (1989) explained that squeezing a two-year MBA program into a single 
year would leave students with less learning, even if all other aspects of the program 
remained constant. In an organizational context, firms that learn too quickly risk specializing 
a sub-optimal strategy (Levinthal, 1997; Levitt & March, 1988), failing to absorb knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), or even declining overall firm performance (Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002).  
Generally, organizational learning theory posits that organizations that learn too 
quickly choose inferior solutions. For example, based on an extensive literature review, 
Levitt and March (1988), caution that “there is a tendency for organizations to specialize and 
for faster learners to specialize in inferior technologies” (Levitt & March, 1988). Simulation 
models concur that fast learning may inadvertently lead firms quickly down inferior paths 
(Levinthal, 1997). Not only is fast organizational learning of concern, but fast learners within 
an organization are also a concern, because organizations with a greater proportion of fast 
individual learners drive out individual-level heterogeneity before the organization’s optimal 
strategy is found (March, 1991).  
The core premise of this work is that organizations that hone in on a solution too 
quickly are more likely to optimize on an inferior strategy and then build experience near the 
chosen strategy. Comparatively, organizations that patiently explore more possible solutions 
ultimately find better strategies, albeit more slowly (March, 1991). However, an assumption 
is rife in this work: heterogeneity is directly related to speed. That is, the heterogeneity of 
ideas is directly related to elapsed calendar time such that the greater the elapsed time, the 
broader the set of considered ideas. Thus, the real conclusion of this work might not be that 
learning slowly, or embracing slow learners, enables organizations to reach more optimal 
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solutions but rather that heterogeneity during the organizational learning process improves 
outcomes (Huber, 1991; Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, & Marangoni, 2003). However, firms 
may vary in the speed at which they gather and evaluate heterogeneous ideas, questioning the 
relationship between the number of ideas considered and elapsed calendar time. Moreover, 
“more time” in a simulation model is typically a larger number of runs of the simulation 
model. Overall, the effects of time compression on learning remain relatively unexplored 
empirically. It is unknown how firms might time compress the benefits of increased 
heterogeneity. 
2.3.2. Time Compression Economies  
Although theoretical work on time-compressed learning suggests that accelerated 
learning is ill-advised, empirical work in new product development (Chen, Reilly, & Lynn, 
2005; Kessler & Bierly, 2002; Lynn et al., 1999; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990; 
Wheelwright & Clark, 1994), technology commercialization (Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, & 
Balkin, 2005), and decision making (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989b) finds 
the opposite: Acceleration leads to improved performance. Time compression economies 
have been found for multiple conceptualizations of performance, including economic value 
(Schoonhoven et al., 1990), quality (Kessler & Bierly, 2002), perception (Lynn et al., 1999), 
and revenue (Markman et al., 2005). For example, Kessler and Bierly (2002) found that 
innovation speed more closely correlates with new product development (NPD) success than 
either increased quality or reduced cost. (For a summary of literature suggesting time-
compression economies, including what is economized, see Table 3.) 
Research espouses many reasons why acceleration leads to improved outcomes. 
Some reasons, like locking up distribution channels and establishing industry standards stem 
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from pioneering new markets (Lynn et al., 1999), because speed is intrinsically related to 
first-mover advantages (Klepper & Simons, 2000; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) as well 
as fast-follower strategies (Hawk et al., 2012; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). Speed 
might also enhance performance because firms that are intrinsically faster than their 
competitors can delay entry decisions until uncertainty is lower, avoiding the risks of early 
entry (Hawk et al., 2012). Other reasons for improved outcomes under time compression 
reflect improvements in internal processes and might be more relevant to time-compressed 
learning. For example research shows that time pressure improves communication and 
stabilizes goals (Lynn et al., 1999). Although this research finds benefits to time 
compression, it has not yet investigated the effects of time compressed learning.  
In sum, the organizational learning and speed literatures come to opposing 
conclusions: Organizational learning theorists posit that acceleration reduces the amount that 
is learned. To the contrary, scholars of organizational processes, such as new product 
development speed find time-compression economies. However, neither stream has 
empirically studied time-compression economies of learning. Thus, the literatures on 
organizational learning and speed have not been adequately bridged.  
2.4. Organizational Speed  
I now turn to research on how firms accelerate other organizational activities, such as 
commercialization, decision making, and new product development. I begin by reviewing the 
acceleration strategies available to firms, including pacing, continuous change, and planning. 
(See Table 4 for selected studies on how to speed up.)  
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2.4.1. Pacing  
One way firms accelerate organizational activities is by pacing events in regular 
intervals (Gersick, 1991, 1994, 1988). Firms that pace activities, such as internationalization 
(Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002) and product launches (Turner, Mitchell, & Bettis, 2011), in a 
regular, rhythmic pattern perform better than firms that follow more random patterns 
(Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). By pacing, firms maintain forward momentum through 
repetitive deadlines and coordinating internal and external actors (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2011; Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998).  
Ostensibly, Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) explore the relationship between pacing 
and learning. They posited that regularly paced international entries enabled firms to learn 
between country entries. Although they found that firms that entered countries at a regular 
pace outperformed those that followed a more irregular time-pattern, it is not clear that they 
actually observed learning speed because they measure the rate of internationalization rather 
than the rate of learning. Moreover, rather than directly observe learning, they inferred it 
based on changes in profitability. The authors then assumed that diminishing returns to 
profitability were due to time-compression diseconomies of learning; however they neither 
measured learning outcomes nor learning speed.  
Pacing can be either time-based or event-based, but time-pacing accelerates 
organizational activities because it gives managers more control over speed. Event-based 
pacing puts more emphasis on outcomes than speed (Gersick, 1994). Groups engage in 
transformative change halfway between a project’s start and completion date (Gersick, 
1988), or if there is no deadline then when the project is about half completed (Gersick, 
1994). This empirical regularity has been observed both in empirical and experimental 
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studies and holds regardless whether the duration of the project is a few hours or several 
months (Gersick, 1989, 1988; Waller, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Giambatista, 2002). Seven out of 
eight of the teams in Gersick’s (1988) foundational study were fairly inertial until halfway 
through their allotted time and did not initially explore broadly. At the halfway point, seven 
of the teams experienced major transitions in the form of a “burst” of changes. After this 
burst, teams experienced a period of momentum, which concluded with a secondary burst 
prior to the end of the task time.  
 
Table 3: Selected Studies Finding Time-Compression Economies 
Study Time-compression  Process Outcome variable  
Kessler and 
Bierly (2002) 
“faster development time is 
related to higher quality 
products”  
 
NPD Quality  
Schoonhoven, 
Eisenhardt, & 
Lyman (1990) 
“Shorter development times 
created greater economic value 
for the innovating 
organization,” 
NPD  Economic value 
Lynn, Skov, and 
Abel (1999)  
“Projects brought to market 
quickly were more likely to be 
perceived as successful.” 
NPD  8-item scale of NPD 
success  
Hawk, Pacheco-
De-Almeida, and 
Yeung, (2012) 
“For an average firm in our 
sample (with a market 
capitalization of $27.6 billion), 
a two-month 
acceleration in average project 
execution speed results in a 
$94.6 million increase in 
predicted 
entry performance” 
Internationaliza-
tion  
Cumulative 
abnormal stock 
market return at the 
time when a firm 
announces entry  
Markman, 
Gianiodis, Phan, 
and Balkin (2005) 
Faster commercialization of 
university technology leads to 
more licensing revenue and 
more start-up ventures 
Tech Transfer Revenue and Start-
ups  
Gilman (1982) Shorter elapsed time between 
initial investment and first 
earnings create greater 
economic value  
Industrial 
Innovation  
Innovation 
introduction rate 
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In sum, although much work has been done to examine how pacing might help firms 
accelerate activities such as new product development and internationalization, this literature 
has omitted learning. Thus, questions remain about how pacing might accelerate learning.  
2.4.2. Planning  
Another way for organizations to accelerate is by planning and then compressing 
steps. Planning may expedite organizational activities, because firms use plans to allocate 
resources, coordinate activities, and avoid mistakes (Delmar & Shane, 2003; Song, Im, van 
der Bij, & Song, 2011). Planning is particularly effective when environments are stable; in 
turbulent environments, plans can become outdated before being implemented (Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi, 1995). Planning activities (e.g., planning meetings, market and scenario analysis, 
portfolio analysis) accelerate firms, though codifying plans delays them (Brinckmann, 
Grichnik, & Kapsa, 2010). Established small firms benefit more from planning than newer 
small firms because they have more knowledge and established routines (Brinckmann et al., 
2010).  
In their survey of 72 product mangers in computer corporations with sales of over 
$50M, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) compared planning and compressing steps to 
implementing without a plan. When markets were uncertain, planning and compressing 
rational steps extended time to market while experiential strategies, including testing and 
multiple design iterations, reduced time to market. When markets were more stable, teams 
that compressed new product development steps by involving suppliers and overlapping 
development steps brought products to market more quickly. Although frequent milestones 
accelerated product development, rewarding for schedule did not.  
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Theoretically, there are several reasons why planning may delay rather than 
accelerate organizations. Organization theory suggests that time spent in planning may 
detract managers from implementation, which might more directly impact speed (Ocasio, 
1997). Also, planning causes rigidities, especially when plans are formalized or when 
resources are acquired according to the plan (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Rigidities can delay 
product development when modifications are required, which is especially likely in rapidly 
changing markets. Finally, firms may never encounter the anticipated problems that surfaced 
during planning or may develop unforeseeable solutions to problems; firms that implement 
without a plan may develop unplanned strategic advantages (Sarasvathy, 2001).  
In sum, prior research suggests that more time spent planning might shorten product 
development time by optimizing processes, avoiding mistakes, and coordinating efforts. 
However, when markets are rapidly changing, planning might delay time to market. 
Although planning might be considered a learning activity, because planners must envision 
the future to develop plans (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), the literature linking planning to 
speed generally fails to address learning. There are two notable exceptions: Recall that the 
exploratory work done by Pisano and his coauthors (2001) found that the fast-learning 
hospital planned while the slower learning hospital did not, suggesting that planning might 
accelerate learning; and Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) integrated learning and planning in 
their study of new product development teams in the computer industry. However, 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi portrayed planning and learning as discrete approaches to new 
product development, thus did not explore how planning might accelerate learning. 
Therefore, although prior researchers have contrasted the effects of planning and learning on 
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new product development speed, more work is needed to explore how planning might affect 
learning speed.  
2.4.3. Prior Experience  
The experience of team members and characteristics of teams’ compositions also 
influence organizational speed. The prior experience of entrepreneurial founding teams, in 
particular, might endure well past the tenure of the team members (Baron, Hannan, & 
Burton, 1999; Stinchcombe, 1965), though the specific relationship between prior experience 
and speed is muddled. Some research suggests that start-ups with a CEO and top 
management team members (TMT) with prior industry and start-up experience bring 
products to market more quickly (Heirman & Clarysse, 2007; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996) 
and are less likely to fail (Yang & Aldrich, 2012). Other research failed to find support for a 
relationship between prior industry experience or prior start-up experience and speed to 
market (Schoonhoven et al., 1990).  
Teams with more experience working together might be more expeditious than newly 
formed teams, because teams with joint experience might retain previously developed work 
processes and communication patterns (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995), including knowing who 
knows what (Wegner, 1987) . There is mixed support for this proposition. Schoonhoven and 
coauthors (1990) tested for but did not find that the tenure of a team improved speed. 
Heirman and Clarysse (2007) found that team joint experience accelerated product launches 
for software teams but had the opposite affect for telecom and medical companies. Having a 
stable team within a firm has been found to expedite new product development (Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1994). Thus there are questions about when a team’s joint experience transfers 
to a new firm and when it might accelerate learning.  
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2.4.4. Team Composition and Traits 
Team composition also affects organizational speed. Cross-functional teams 
accelerate new product introductions, both in entrepreneurial teams (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1994; Schoonhoven et al., 1990) and in established firms (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). 
Homogenous management teams respond more quickly to competitor moves but launch 
innovative products more slowly (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). 
The nature of the CEO or team leader also impacts organizational speed. Strong 
leaders bring products to market more quickly (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1994; Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi, 1995; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996; Wheelwright & Clark, 1994) and facilitate 
accelerate decision making (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). This differs with organizational 
learning studies that suggest that inclusive leaders accelerate learning (Pisano et al., 2001). 
Given the inconsistency between the speed literature, which suggests that stronger CEOs 
launch products more quickly, and the learning literature, which suggests that more inclusive 
CEOs encourage team-learning, questions remain about the relationship between the 
perceived strength of a CEO or team leader and learning speed. 
Teams that have worked together before also accelerate organizational speed, though 
theory points us in opposing directions. On one hand, teams with joint experience may be 
faster, because they have developed transactive memory systems that store knowledge about 
team member’s individual competencies, group coordination, communication, and trust, thus 
might accelerate learning by expediting searching for information known by the collective 
team (Wegner, 1987). On the other, shared experience may constrain knowledge sharing 
(Stasser & Titus, 1987), knowledge combinations (Kogut & Zander, 1992), and search 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992), leading to more incremental learning. Work in this tradition 
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generally examines the relationship between teams and the speed of an organizational 
activity other than learning, and little is known about how team experience and composition 
might affect learning speed. 
Overall, prior work excludes learning from the discussion of the effects of team 
experience and composition on speed outcomes. The dependent variable in these studies is 
generally the speed of an organizational process, such as new product development. Some 
studies discuss how learning might accelerate organizational processes, but extant research 
falls short of suggesting how firms might accelerate learning. Thus, the relationship between 
prior industry, start-up, and joint experience and learning speed remains elusive. Finally, the 
speed and learning literature provide conflicting guidance on the effect of strong leaders. The 
speed literature suggests that strong leaders bring products to market more quickly, while the 
learning literature suggests that strong leaders may not elicit divergent opinions and might 
constrain learning. This study explicitly examines team characteristics on learning speed, 
addressing the many related gaps discussed in this section. 
2.5. Literature Discussion 
Prior work on organizational learning suggests many ways organizations learn, 
including by experience, observing others, experimenting, trial and error, and improvisation. 
Research suggests that firms follow learning curves, whereby more experience leads to more 
learning (Argote, 1999). Firms learn at varying rates (Argote & Epple, 1990; Argote, 1999; 
Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Pisano et al., 2001), thus some firms are able to learn more quickly 
than their peers. Much research examining how firms accelerate learning from experience is 
limited to learning during production ramp-up after the first product is defined and often 
examines the speed of an activity other than learning. Moreover, research in this tradition 
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compares the speed of different modes of learning, assuming that learning speeds are fixed. 
(See Table 5 for a summary of studies that compare learning modes.) Thus, questions remain 
about how to accelerate learning in other contexts. That is, how does accelerated learning 
happen?  
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Table 4: Selected Organizational Speed Studies 
Article What is 
accelerated? 
Research question Sample  Main concept  
Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi (1995) 
NPD  When do firms use 
a compression 
model and when do 
they use an 
experimentation 
model of 
acceleration?  
72 products at 36 
computer 
companies in the 
United States, 
Europe, and Asia 
with sales greater 
than $50 million.  
NPD speed processes differ 
under different levels of 
uncertainty. Compression 
works best when low-
uncertainty and acceleration 
(experimentation) when high 
uncertainty. 
Heirman and 
Clarysse 
(2007) 
1st new 
product 
launch  
When do start-ups 
launch their first 
product more 
quickly?  
99 research-based 
start-ups  founded 
in Flanders 
 
Speed to launch is affected by 
tangible assets, such as 
starting capital and the stage 
of product development, and 
intangible assets, such as team 
tenure, experience of 
founders, and collaborations 
assets. 
Brown and 
Eisenhardt 
(1997) 
NPD How do 
organizations 
change in fast-
paced industries?  
6 computer firms Firms continuously change by 
continuously linking 
sequential projects with 
rhythmic processes, extensive 
communication, and low cost 
probes into the future 
Schoonhoven, 
Eisenhardt and 
Lyman (1990)  
1st new 
product 
launch  
What accelerates 
first product 
shipment for 
entrepreneurial 
ventures? 
98 entrepreneurial 
ventures in the 
continental United 
States 
semiconductor 
industry  
First product launch is 
accelerated when product has 
lower levels of technological 
innovation, firm has low 
monthly expenditures, 
founding team includes 
marketing and manufacturing, 
product market has more 
competitors, and firm located 
in the Silicon Valley. 
Vermeulen and 
Barkema – 
(2002)  
Entry into 
foreign 
markets  
How do different 
rates and patterns of 
expansion affect 
performance? 
572 expansions by 
22 multinational 
firms traded on the 
Amsterdam stock 
market over 26 
years 
The speed, scope, and pace of 
internationalization moderate 
performance. The main effect 
of speed was insignificant. 
Lynn, Skov, 
and Abel 
(1999) 
NPD  How is speed 
related to NPD 
success? How can 
firms speed NPD?  
95 surveys 
administered to 
NPD managers 
affiliate with the 
American Society 
for Engineering 
Management  
Reviewing information, 
having a NPD process, and 
setting clear and stable goals 
speed up NPD.  
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The effects of time compression on learning are also elusive. Organizational learning 
theory posits that firms that try to accelerate learning reduce the amount of learning absorbed 
or optimize on inferior strategies, but organizational speed research finds that acceleration 
improves outcomes in new product development, technology commercialization, and 
decision making. Neither of these research streams addresses how to accelerate learning. 
The literature on organizational speed suggests that pacing and planning accelerate 
organizational activities such as new product development, commercialization, and decision 
making. Team experience and composition also affect organizational speed. However, the 
speed and learning literatures provide conflicting guidance on the effect of strong leaders. 
The speed literature suggests that strong leaders bring products to market more quickly, 
while the learning literature suggests that strong leaders may not elicit divergent opinions and 
thus might constrain learning. Moreover, prior work on the effect of joint tenure on speed is 
inconclusive. Overall, this literature examines the speed of an activity other than. Thus we do 
not know if the same mechanisms accelerate learning.  
In summary, I have reviewed the literature on organizational learning and speed to 
identify some of the factors that might contribute to accelerated learning. There may also be 
unknown factors, which might be uncovered as a result of this study.  
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Table 5: Relative Speed of Learning Mechanisms  
Comparison When faster When learning-by-doing is faster  
Experimentation  Cogent theoretical understanding  Novel technology, lower theoretical 
understanding  
Planning  Stable environment Turbulent environment 
Trial and error  Start close to optimum, lab and 
environment similar  
Unsure where to begin or much to 
learn  
Improvisation  Tolerance for cognitive reframing, 
strong communication  
No comparison  
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
3.1. Research Setting  
The research setting is accelerator programs: fast-paced, limited-duration 
entrepreneurship education programs (Miller & Bound, 2011). Cohorts of nascent ventures 
enter, participate, and exit programs together. Programs culminate in “Demo Day” events, 
where venture founders pitch their business concepts to large audiences of potential 
investors. Accelerators are an ideal setting to study accelerated learning because the limited 
duration of the programs and grand final presentations create substantial time pressure for 
participating ventures. A founder described the intensity of the time pressure, “We had a 
clock that counted down minutes and seconds to Demo Day. It’s ridiculous and not 
sustainable and offensive in terms of humanity.” Although the programs’ intensity might be 
challenging for participants, it is ideal for studying business acceleration. 
3.2 Definition of Accelerators  
I begin with the definition provided by NESTA, an independent research organization 
in the United Kingdom. According to NESTA, accelerators have five main features that 
distinguish them from other types of investors or business incubators. They are:  
 “An application process that is open to all, yet highly competitive. 
 Provision of pre-seed investment, usually in exchange for equity. 
 A focus on small teams not individual founders. 
 Time-limited support comprising programmed events and intensive mentoring. 
 Cohorts or ‘classes’ of startups rather than individual companies.” (Miller & 
Bound, 2011) 
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I discussed the definition of accelerators with industry experts and accelerator 
founders during exploratory interviews. Based on the information provided by my 
informants, I relax some of Miller and Bound’s (2011) criteria and use the following 
definition in my research: Accelerators are organizations that provide entrepreneurship 
education for a limited period of time to cohorts of selected nascent ventures who begin and 
graduate together. Key to my definition is the concept of cohorts entering and exiting 
programs together. This distinguishes accelerators from other organizational forms, including 
incubators and angel investors, who establish and modify relationships with ventures on an 
ongoing basis.  
A typical accelerator invests $15,000 to $20,000 in two-to-three person venture teams 
in exchange for 6 to 8% equity. In general, programs are three months long and cohorts 
include 10 to 12 ventures. However, there is considerable variation. For example, some 
accelerators offer office space (e.g., TechStars), but not all (e.g., YCombinator). Cohorts 
range in size from 5 to over 100 ventures. Some programs offer grants (e.g., RockHealth) or 
prize money (e.g., MassChallenge) while most provide ventures with investments in 
exchange for equity. A couple have deals with outside investors who grant all graduating 
ventures with $50,000 to $150,000 of convertible debt, priced at the next investment round 
(e.g., YCombinator, post-2009; Excelerate Labs, post-2011). Most programs are about three 
months long. Most focus on technology, such as mobile, cloud computing, or software 
development. However, accelerators help entrepreneurs in a wide range of industries 
including healthcare (e.g., RockHealth), advertising (e.g., The Brandery), social 
responsibility (e.g., Bethnal Green Venture), and education (e.g., Imagine k12). Still other 
programs focus on helping minority (e.g., NewMe) or women (e.g., Women in Mobile) 
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entrepreneurs. Some programs have an industry or technology focus (e.g., TechStars Cloud), 
while others are more general (e.g., MassChallenge). Some programs are affiliated with 
universities (e.g., StartX), or funded by governments (e.g., MassChallenge), but most are 
funded by individual investors or successful entrepreneurs.  
Some accelerators follow highly structured processes while others are more ad-hoc. 
Nearly all programs culminate in Demo Days, where venture founders deliver short 
presentations to large audiences of potential investors. Some programs are closely affiliated 
with larger organizations, such as ad agencies, government institutions, or universities. 
Finally, most accelerator founders were formerly entrepreneurs or angel investors, though 
some were corporate executives or affiliated with public institutions (e.g., incubators or 
universities). Given the amount of heterogeneity between programs, the accelerator setting 
provides an interesting opportunity for academic researchers to develop a nuanced 
understanding of how these programs might impact participating ventures.  
3.3 History of Accelerators  
The first accelerator, YCombinator, was founded in 2005 by Paul Graham, who was 
an angel investor and former entrepreneur. Since its inception, YCombinator has funded over 
450 startups
1
, including Loopt, Reddit, Scribd, Dropbox, Heroku, Posterous, Airbnb, and 
Hipmunk. According to Forbes Magazine, as of April 2012, the cumulative valuation of 
YCombinator companies was $7.8 billion (Geron, 2012).  
Graham founded YCombinator after delivering a speech about how to start a 
company to a group of undergraduate students at the Harvard Computer Society. During his 
speech, Graham suggested that budding entrepreneurs raise angel funding from wealthy 
                                                 
1
 http://www.ycombinator.com  
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individuals, preferably successful entrepreneurs with technology backgrounds. When the 
students turned to him as a potential investor, he immediately added, “Not me,” but later 
decided to invest in a batch of eight ventures (Lee, 2006). An accidental byproduct of 
simultaneously investing in several ventures founded by young, inexperienced entrepreneurs 
was batching investments into cohorts and providing education and advice to the group 
(Levy, 2011). This group of young entrepreneurs included Reddit, which was acquired by 
Condé Nast for between $10M and $13M (Chafkin, 2009), and Loopt, which was acquired 
for about $43M by Green Dot. According to Graham’s blog, batching investments provided 
unexpected economies. He continued to batch seed-stage investments, eventually forming 
YCombinator with three cofounders. YCombinator was founded in Cambridge, MA, near 
Harvard, with a second annual session in the Silicon Valley. Eventually, YCombinator closed 
the Cambridge office and offered two sessions in the Silicon Valley. Not only is 
YCombinator the oldest accelerator, but with 84 firms in its last cohort, it is also one of the 
largest.  
YCombinator received much attention in the technology trade press. Given the 
amount of press it received, it is not surprising that other investors began batching seed 
investments and offering similar educational programs. One of the first imitators was 
TechStars. Unlike YCombinator’s accidental founding, when TechStars launched in 2007, it 
had a specific goal in mind: enhance the entrepreneurial community of Boulder, CO. 
TechStars now has locations in Boulder, Boston, Seattle, New York City, and Austin, TX, as 
well as a growing global network of 50 affiliated accelerators through the Global Accelerator 
Network. TechStars’ founders and accelerator directors have been prolific public advocates 
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of accelerators and entrepreneurship
2
. For example, they aired a reality show on Bloomberg 
TV that highlighted key events of the 2011 New York cohort, and one of the founders, Brad 
Feld, has penned several popular entrepreneurship books (e.g., Feld & Cohen, 2010; Feld & 
Mendelson, 2011). Further promoting entrepreneurship, the TechStars Web site includes 
standard documents such as term sheets.  
Today, there are more than 300 acceleration programs on five continents that have 
collectively helped 2500 firms
3
. These numbers are growing rapidly, making seed 
accelerators an important, but under-studied, topic for research. 
3.4. Comparison: Accelerators, Incubators and Angels  
Accelerators are similar to but different from incubators and angel investors. (See 
Table 6 for a summary of the differences between incubators, investors, and accelerators.) 
Although all three organizational forms assist fledging ventures, a few key variations 
differentiate accelerators. The most important difference is the duration of the programs. 
Ventures in incubators stay indefinitely and enter and exit individually (Rothaermel & 
Thursby, 2005a). Ventures in accelerators stay for a predetermined amount of time and enter 
and exit in cohorts. Set timelines and strict graduation dates reduces codependency between 
ventures and accelerators and forces ventures to face market selection mechanisms. One of 
the industry’s pioneers explained,  
The fundamental difference between an incubator and an accelerator is by having a 
finite duration, it really forces these companies to get a lot done get in a very short 
period of time.. . . If you have something that has a 6-12 months duration you end up 
in a co-dependent relationship that is not particularly healthy. We are trying to help 
very aggressively at the front and then help continually through the life of the 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Brad Feld, David Cohen, and David Tisch. 
3 
There is no official count of accelerators, I have hand-collected a database of approximately 300 
accelerators operating on five continents.  
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companies in the next one to ten years. But if you stretch out that intense fun and 
period you start to build more dependencies between each other and that's not good. 
 
The business models of incubators and accelerators are also different. Incubators 
charge rent (Allen & McCluskey, 1990) for physical space (Smilor, 1987) and do not have 
their own investment funds (Hackett & Dilts, 2004). In fact, firms in incubators are called 
“tenants.” In contrast, accelerators usually make equity investments in participating firms or, 
less frequently, are non-profit organizations. The incentives of accelerators that invest in 
participating ventures are thus more closely aligned with the ventures. Incubators might 
delay growth or disbanding that would result in reduced profits from rent. Accelerators want 
growth that leads to positive exit. Firms in accelerators are referred to as “portfolio 
companies.” 
 Finally, incubators offer limited mentorship, which is typically offered for a fee by 
professional service providers such as accountants and lawyers. Incubator tenants rarely take 
full advantage of available advice. On the other hand, intense mentorship is a cornerstone of 
accelerator programs and often the primary reason ventures participate.  
Accelerators are also unlike angel investors. Angel investors continuously make 
individual investment decisions, but accelerators batch investments and accept ventures 
based on a competitive application process. Angel investors might have a board seat and 
meet with their portfolio firms periodically. Angel investors mentor portfolio firms 
themselves, though they typically do not collocate with portfolio companies. However, 
accelerator directors work alongside participating ventures and connect them with mentors, 
including investors and active or former entrepreneurs. An angel investor who was also a 
mentor at Hickory explained that accelerators are “all about the mentoring process versus the 
investment business.” She elaborated, “There are similarities in that we’re evaluating 
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opportunities, and looking at the same types of features. However, in the investment business, 
the goal is to allocate capital as efficiently, and as profitably as possible.”  
Essentially, accelerators recombine financial resources and knowledge resources 
previously offered by angels and incubators, providing less money and more advice than 
either angels or incubators. 
 
Table 6: Summary of the Differences between Incubators, Investors, and Accelerators 
 
Accelerators Incubators Angel Investors 
Duration  3 months  1-5 yrs  Ongoing  
Cohorts  Yes  No  No  
Business Model  Investment  Rent; non-profit  Investment  
Selection  Competitive, cyclical  Non competitive  Competitive, ongoing  
Venture Stage  Early  Early, or late  Early 
Education  Seminars  Ad hoc, hr/legal  None  
Venture location  On-site On-site Off-site 
Mentorship  Intense, by self and 
others  
Minimal, tactical  As needed, by investor  
 
3.5 Research Setting  
Accelerator programs were chosen as the research setting because the principle 
function of accelerators is to accelerate organizational learning during gestation. My data 
suggest that some accelerators are more effective at accelerating learning than others, 
providing an opportunity to compare program attributes and effectiveness.  
Studying accelerators and participating ventures has many advantages. First, 
accelerators and participating nascent firms are young, which avoids left-truncation, an issue 
with much prior work, because variance in incumbent organizations’ learning speeds might 
be due to variation historical learning capabilities rather than due to variation observed 
during the studies (Argote, 1999; Yang & Aldrich, 2012). Also, nascent ventures are 
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relatively small. This facilitates observation of learning in groups, which are the building 
blocks of larger organizations (Argote, 1999; Schilling et al., 2003). Fledging ventures in 
accelerators are learning prior to scaled production thus providing an opportunity to extend 
prior work typically set in established manufacturing or service firms (e.g., Argote, 1999). 
Finally, acceleration programs are generally three months long, forcing temporal 
compression and placing ventures under duress.  
Also, participating ventures learn from multiple actors affiliated with accelerators. 
Participating nascent ventures learn from directors, who cumulate and then transfer expertise. 
They also learn from mentors, who might be investors, entrepreneurs, corporate executives, 
lawyers, or accountants. Finally, participating ventures often learn from each other. Ventures 
participating in the same program at the same time are collectively called a “cohort.” 
Ventures who have graduated from the same program are collectively called “alumni.”  
3.6. Research Design  
The research design is an embedded multiple case inductive study (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989a). An inductive methodology is appropriate for several 
reasons: (1) There is insufficient extant theory to establish testable hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Suddaby, 2006; Yin, 2009); (2) the phenomena—accelerators are a contemporary 
organizational form with insufficient archival data (Yin, 2009); and (3) this study describes 
knowledge transfer in detail (Easterby-Smith, Lyles, & Tsang, 2008). The research design 
nests ventures and mentors within accelerators, providing information from multiple 
organizations at multiple levels of analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2009). The multiple 
case design grounds theory by using replication logic; findings were replicated across 
accelerators as well as across ventures within each accelerator (Yin, 2009). Data from each 
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accelerator collaborated or disconfirmed theory elaborated from other cases (Yin, 2009). This 
study’s embedded design further grounds emerging theory, improves reliability, and 
enhances internal validity and depth of understanding.  
I collected data from accelerator directors, venture founders, and mentors nested 
within nine domestic accelerators (See Table 7 for details on sampling strategy and Table 8 
for a description of the sample). Accelerator names are disguised with pseudonyms taken 
from tree names. I followed a theoretically guided sampling strategy (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) and sampled accelerators in different geographic regions (Eastern, Middle, and 
Western United States) to improve generalizability to different regions (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009) and different cohort sizes (small, medium, and large) to probe the possible effects of 
cohort size.  
In general, the accelerators in my sample are general technology accelerators. 
However, the types and stages of ventures varied significantly. Although most of the 
ventures in this study are mobile or Web-based firms, there were four consumer products 
firms (cereal, footwear, women’s apparel, and toy) and an airline. A few ventures in my 
sample are social ventures—for example, one raises money for families incurring 
extraordinary medical expenses. Several ventures developed technological solutions to 
traditional industries, such as energy, banking, education, and real estate. Founding teams 
ranged in size from one to four, with an average of 2.2 founders per team. The average age of 
venture founders in my sample was 31, slightly higher than that of their cofounders (30.25). 
Seventy five percent of the founding teams are composed solely of men. 
Accelerators also varied. The number of accelerator directors ranged from one who 
was only available a few hours per week to eight who were available full-time. The physical 
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spaces of the accelerators also differed. Redwood did not offer ventures office space; 
ventures worked from their homes or offices and gathered onsite for weekly dinners and 
other special events. Most accelerators in this study had open work space where ventures 
work alongside each other and accelerator directors. Oak, a large accelerator, had one 
enormous open floor of a building. Birch and Chestnut offered space, but each venture 
worked in an individual office.  
 
Table 7: Sample Design, U.S. 
 East  Middle  West  
Small  Chestnut  Ash  Pine  
Med  Birch  Hickory  Fir  
Large  Oak  Alder*  Redwood 
* Alder has multiple locations, a Middle US location is the primary source of data for this 
study, though other locations were also included to assess generalizability. No significant 
differences were observed.  
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Table 8: Sample Description  
Name  Duration*
+
   Location  Cohort Size  # of mentors  Convertible Debt  
Chestnut  3 months  East  Small  60  No  
Birch  3 months  East  Medium  250  No  
Oak  4 months
+
  East  Large  350  No  
Ash  10-12 weeks
+
  Middle US  Small  20  No  
Hickory  3 months
+
  Middle US  Medium  112  $50,000  
Alder
°
  3 months  Multiple  Medium  100  $100,000  
Pine  3 months*  West  Small  200  No  
Fir  10 weeks  West  Medium  50  100,000  
 Redwood 3 months * West  Large  0  $150,000  
* Can start before + can stay past end 
° 
Top row shows primary data collection site, bottom shows all 
Convertible debt is offered by external VCs who give favorable terms to all participating ventures at the accelerator.  
Alder’s Middle US location is primary location of study  
 
3.7. Exploratory Work  
As is customary with grounded theory building research (Eisenhardt, 1989a), I began 
by conducting exploratory work to understand accelerators and identify opportunities for 
research. Initially, I read magazine articles (e.g., Levy, 2011), stories in industry trade e-
publications (e.g., TechCrunch), popular books (Feld & Cohen, 2010; Feld & Mendelson, 
2011; Ries, 2011), and blog entries written by accelerator directors and participating ventures 
(e.g., Paul Graham of YCombinator and Brad Feld of TechStars). Simultaneously, I reviewed 
academic research on incubators (e.g., Rothaermel & Thursby, 2005a, 2005b; Smilor, 1987) 
and investors (e.g., Clark 2008, Hallen 2008, Hochberg et al. 2007, Hsu 2007), in addition to 
the organizational learning literature reviewed above. Next, I conducted exploratory 
interviews with industry pundits, academic scholars, accelerator directors, and venture 
founders who had participated in accelerators. Exploratory interviews, which were conducted 
via telephone and in person, ranged from 45 minutes to several hours. Initially, I asked broad 
questions about accelerators to grasp what they do, how they interact with participating 
ventures, and how they differ from angel investors and incubators. I also asked open-ended 
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questions about how the accelerator operates and how firms change during the process. All 
but four interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. Transcripts were reviewed by 
two researchers to provide two independent perspectives (Yin, 2009) . Exploratory 
interviews also helped develop interview guides, which were refined after each exploratory 
interview.  
3.8. Data Sources  
Consistent with prior work employing grounded theory methodology (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 
2009), data were collected from retrospective and real-time sources (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2009), including transcribed semi-structured interviews; email correspondence for 
clarification and progress updates; and archival data such as accelerator and company Web 
sites, blogs, LinkedIn profiles, trade publications, field observations, and funding databases 
such as Crunchbase. This multi-faceted data collection strategy afforded multiple types of 
triangulation, thus improving reliability and credibility of results (Yin, 2009).  
The primary sources of data for this study are semi-structured interviews with 
accelerator directors (1–2 individuals), founders of graduated ventures (4–6 per accelerator), 
and mentors (1–2 per accelerator). Approximately 70 interviews were conducted using three 
protocols, which included open and closed-ended questions. . (See Appendix.) Each protocol 
has three parts: background information, details on the accelerator programs, and direct 
questions about progress and learning. I used “courtroom” procedure; I directed informants 
to step through the progression of the program, beginning with the application process. I then 
asked what happened between being accepted and beginning the program. Next, I asked what 
happened during the first day, week, month, and so on. Asking informants to chronologically 
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recount events reduces subject bias (Huber, 1985). Next, I posed open-ended questions that 
focused on different actors, such as directors, mentors, cohort members, and teammates. For 
example, “How, if at all, did you interact with your cohort?” The interviews concluded by 
gathering historical information on the performance of the ventures and direct questions 
about how much they learned from mentors, accelerator directors, cohort members, and 
customers. I closed by asking if there was anything else that the informant would like to 
share. The protocols included both nondirective and directive questions to ground theoretical 
insights and reduce bias (Eisenhardt, 1989b). I continued conducting interviews until 
responses no longer added novel insights (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
Several additional precautions were taken to reduce bias. All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, and analyzed by two researchers. All informants were guaranteed 
anonymity and confidentiality to improve the integrity of responses. Multiple informants 
were used when possible, so that information could be triangulated (Yin, 2009). To improve 
recall, informants were all highly involved with the accelerator, either as a founder or 
managing director of the accelerator, as a founder of a firm that participated in the 
accelerator, or as an active mentor.  
3.9. Data Analysis 
Data analysis occurred over several stages. The first stage entailed developing 
interactive case histories for each accelerator and embedded venture (Eisenhardt, 1989a). I 
induced the programming elements of each accelerator programs, re-creating program 
timelines and describing the roles of the actors during each phase. Case histories detailed 
how learning was accelerated during the various stages of the program. For example, they 
include information about what firms learned from mentor meetings and educational 
45 
programming such as seminars. Developing case histories serves a dual function: Completed 
histories inform the research report, while the process of creating the case histories helps the 
researchers become fastidiously familiar with the details of the case (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Thus, I developed case histories as data were collected, and occasionally adjusted interview 
protocols or other data collection efforts to seize unfolding opportunities. For example, the 
study design initially sampled more mentors and fewer venture founders. During analysis, I 
realized that mentors were less involved and provided less insight than venture founders. 
Thus, I modified the study design to increase the number of venture founders and decrease 
the number of mentors in my sample. To improve objectivity and more strongly ground 
theory, a second researcher reviewed interviews and case histories as they were created.  
Case histories were then used for within-case and cross-case analyses (Yin, 2009). 
Within-case analyses compared how different firms participating in the same accelerator 
program accelerated learning, while cross-case analyses compared different accelerator 
programs. Both types of analyses used replication logic to ground emergent theory (Yin, 
2009). I used a host of strategies suggested by prior research, including placing data in 
matrices to look for non-obvious patterns, developing timelines, and creating flow-charts 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles & Huberman, 1994). I used MaxQda (version 11.01) software to 
organize, tabulate, and retrieve data. Quantitative data were tabulated, and summary statistics 
were calculated and compared across accelerators (Yin 2009). I continued to iterate between 
data collection, analysis, and existing theory to clarify findings and refine theoretical 
arguments.   
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3.10. Accelerated Learning  
The unit of analysis for this study is ventures participating in accelerator programs. In 
this section, I present evidence of accelerated learning. In the findings discussed in the next 
section, I discuss mechanisms that accelerated learning.  
Table 9 summarizes this study’s evidence of accelerated learning. I assessed whether 
learning was accelerated by averaging venture founders’ responses to the questions “rate 
your venture’s progress” and “rate the amount your firm learned” and calculating the 
proportion of venture founders who said the program length was about right. The responses 
were provided on a seven-point Likert scale. Informants at all but one of the accelerators 
rated the amount learned higher than the amount of progress made by the venture. 
Additionally, I coded learning as accelerated if the informant described his venture’s learning 
as being faster than it otherwise would have been if it had not participated in the accelerator.  
Many of the participants said that learning was accelerated, though none were asked 
directly. For example, one founder answered the question, “How did your relationship with 
your co-founders change during the program, if at all?” as follows:  
It was a great time for us to start together from the beginning of boot camp all the 
way through working with mentors. It saved us time making silly mistakes that if it 
was just the three of us on our own could have taken us six months to make those 
mistakes and then figure out what we should be working on. 
 
Another replied to a question about changing his self-evaluation of his firm’s 
potential, 
We were able to get answers to those questions fairly quickly, and then able to 
develop the business into the answers that we got . . . it would have taken us a very 
long time to answer these questions as well as we did in Hickory, and we were able to 
do that very great work within a matter of weeks instead of a matter of months. 
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Ventures also felt significant time pressure. The time pressure focused founder’s 
attention on extracting all they can from the accelerator before they graduated from the 
program. As one founder at Oak said,  
It’s intense because this is your time to really accelerate your company so 
there’s no like, I’m going to take this and sleep on it. You’ve got to make 
decisions quickly, make your best effort to take advantage of all those 
resources that are going to go away once accelerator is done. You really do 
feel that pressure of this is a once in a lifetime opportunity to have all of these 
resources, I’ve got to make the best of it so there is that time pressure for sure. 
 
Given the pressure to learn quickly, we might have expected a trade-off between 
learning speed and quality (Levinthal & March, 1981). However, several founders did not 
experience a tradeoff. For example, a founder at Alder said his venture “moved forward 
faster and more effectively.” A founder at Birch agreed, “An accelerator is definitely that, it’s 
rapid development, rapid marketing and it’s making sure that you’re still maintaining the 
path and you’re staying in the right direction.” Another founder at Birch explained with 
more nuance, 
The development itself is more rapid but the way that we’re releasing, the way that 
we’re strategizing between each product release, even though the development is 
faster, we are a little more careful, we don’t push it. May be if this was six months 
ago we would have just pushed it now we’re a little more meticulous in terms of what 
we’re doing, why we’re doing it. 
 
Thus, my data suggest that ventures learned quickly, and there was evidence that 
acceleration did not degrade the quality. To the contrary, the ventures I spoke to described 
how, almost paradoxically, acceleration enhanced what they learned. They learned faster, but 
more thoughtfully than before.  
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Table 9: Accelerated Learning 
Accelerator 
Avg. learning
4
/ 
progress  
% 
length 
right
5
 Was Learning Accelerated? 
Chestnut  6.00 
5.00 
66% Yes “It is more about avoiding mistakes, so it avoiding 
loosing time and trying things that take you nowhere.” 
No “It took me 2 years to come to that conclusion.” 
Birch  5.33  
5.00 
50%  Yes “These past 3 months would have taken us, I don’t even 
know, from a product standpoint, probably next year. . . . 
Your product is going to be exponentially faster in an 
accelerator.”  
No “In hindsight we could have done more in that 
timeframe.” 
Yes “The development itself is more rapid but the way that 
we’re releasing, the way that we’re strategizing between 
each products, even though the development is faster.” 
Oak  5.5  
5.4 
75%  Yes “I would never have been able to do any of those things 
without OAK. I mean, maybe not never, but I can’t imagine 
how I would have gotten that information.”  
Yes “Could have taken us six months to make those 
mistakes and then figure out what we should be working on 
we could have wasted six months and gotten nowhere with 
sales. But, you know, as a team, we were just able to learn 
much faster.”  
Yes “It would have definitely taken me another year to get to 
the point where I was at the end of the accelerator on my 
own.” 
Yes “Learning that stuff on your own and becoming an 
expert on your own is time consuming.” 
No “ My sales didn’t increase as a result of Oak .” 
Ash  6.00 
5.00  
0  Yes “So while it seems like it took less time it was really 
intense but we were a 100 percent focused on it.”  
Hickory  6.40  
6.20 
80%  Yes “It would have taken us a very long time to answer these 
questions as well as we did in Hickory, and we were able to 
do that very great work within a matter of week instead of a 
matter of months.”  
Yes “I can't expect that kind of introspection in that time, 
and you just never get that when you are working alone.”  
Yes “I don’t know if I ever would find that out, or probably 
take a lot longer.” “It accelerated figuring out that the 
business was not going to work.” 
(mentor) “It’s just an amazing opportunity to suck in a lot of 
information as your business is in its critical stage, and move 
it forward.”  
(mentor) “An intense period where they learned a lot.” 
Yes “You have to build the business fast. You have to have a 
killer network. And you have to know how to do it. This is a 
learned skill. It's not inherent.” 
                                                 
4
 Venture founders were asked to rate their venture’s overall learning on a seven-point Likert scale  
5
 Venture founders were asked, “How do you think the program’s length affected what you got out of the program?” Measure is 
percentage of informants whose answer suggested length was right.  
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Accelerator 
Avg. learning
4
/ 
progress  
% 
length 
right
5
 Was Learning Accelerated? 
Alder  6.40  
6.00 
100%  Yes “They got us on a track which was ultimately was going 
to be a lot more successful. They got us off one that was not 
going to be successful and may have taken us six or nine 
months to find out.”  
Yes “It’s incredible that that evolution can happen in such a 
period of time and I don’t think anything like that could have 
happened outside of Alder. . . . you learn how to make a 
decision quickly and see if it’s going to work and then move 
off of that if it’s not going to work.” 
Yes “It accelerated our education. I mean, our education as 
business people.” 
Yes “I was trying to consume as much information as 
possible.” 
Pine  5.33 
4 
66%  Yes “It sped us up.”  
Fir 5.5 
4.75 
66% Yes “It definitely accelerated fundraising abilities. It 
accelerated growth of the product user base as well, because 
we are at a high end much faster.” 
Yes “I think we would have done well be would have done it 
slower.” 
No “It did not accelerate that much…other companies in my 
cohort…were able to raise funding relatively quickly.” 
Redwood  5.6 
6.25 
100% Yes “It was the same amount of learning I had in two years 
of college, or three years of college.”  
Yes “We learned literally everything we know now.” 
Yes “I don’t know if we would have ever launched, we 
would have gotten discouraged before launching.” 
Yes “It would take other people years to learn just through 
the process of like going through the office hours through 
the summer.” 
Yes “We learned lessons that it would take other people 
years to learn.” 
Yes “In that 10 weeks you basically hack in what could be 
the first few years of your company’s life.” 
Yes “A sprint.” 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
HOW TO ACCELERATE ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
 
How do accelerators accelerate learning? I discovered that accelerators accelerated 
learning by reducing the antecedents to learning, which I call learning-coordination costs. I 
define learning-coordination costs as expenditures such as time or money required to set up 
learning. Learning-coordination costs include administrative tasks such as scheduling 
interactions and traveling as well as networking prior to learning interactions. My analysis 
suggests ventures accelerated learning via four constructs that emerged from the data: (1) 
mentor overload—time-compressed interactions with external advisors that delayed 
implementation, (2) director experts—advisors who consolidated and transferred experience 
to nascent ventures, (3) divided teams—founding team members who split up rather than 
band together during experience accumulation, and (4) cohort peers—ventures who were 
concurrently both rivals and supporters.  
4.1. Mentor Overload  
As discussed above, prior work places a high value on learning-by-doing in uncertain 
markets (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 1994) because time 
spent implementing might more directly impact learning and performance speed than time 
spent in other learning modes (Ocasio, 1997). In contrast, firms in this study accelerated 
learning by delaying learning-by-doing. Firms began learning by receiving an abundance of 
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advice from a diverse group of mentors
6
. Informants referred to this accelerated learning 
process as mentor whiplash, or mentor dating. Their descriptions of the process were 
consistent with theories of cognitive overload. Thus, I named this construct mentor overload. 
Based on informants’ descriptions, I define mentor overload as time-compressed engagement 
with external advisors who give conflicting feedback while implementation is delayed. 
Ventures received feedback from mentors on both real and hypothetical products and 
strategies. Founding teams often became confused as they explored options with mentors 
prior to implementation. Yet, their vision crystallized by the end of the mentor overload 
period. 
Table 10 summarizes evidence on mentor overload and includes measures along three 
dimensions: conflicting advice, reduced coordination costs, and an assessment of delayed 
implementation. I assessed the amount of conflicting advice by measuring the number of 
meetings founders had with different mentors within the first month of their program and 
reports of confusing or conflicting advice. I coded overload positively when venture founders 
reported being confused or overwhelmed. I evaluated reduced coordination costs by 
comparing the frequency with which accelerator directors or staff scheduled mentor meetings 
to the frequency with which venture founders scheduled mentor meetings. Finally, I coded 
implementation as delayed if the informant told me that progress on the venture’s product 
development was delayed during mentor overload.  
Hickory provides an example of mentor overload. Nearly all of the Hickory venture 
founders experienced mentor overload. Hickory scheduled all the ventures’ mentor meetings, 
                                                 
6
 The term “mentor” typically includes any external advisor and might include guest speakers, advisors 
who meet with venture founders for 15–60 minutes, and advisors who provide frequent advice during the 
program and sometimes become board members. 
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which happened at Hickory’s office. According to Hickory’s managing director, the ten 
ventures that participated in the 2011 program collectively held 740 meetings with a total of 
140 mentors in just 19 days. Hickory venture founders met with an average of 63 mentors 
during the first 3 weeks of the program
7
. Further, 80 percent of the founder-informants 
reported that they received conflicting advice during the mentor dating period. 
Hickory’s managing director described what founders experience during mentor 
dating, “They are just getting challenged, and challenged, and challenged, and it sort of like 
their business plan gets ripped to pieces, but in many different directions, and this is one of 
the really challenging things. So, one of the mentors tell them to turn left, some say turn 
right, go up, go down, go backwards, go forwards, every which direction.” The founders then 
figure out “how to put this back together to make it even better.”  
Hickory scheduled mentor meetings, which saved founders time. As one founder 
stated, “Access to people I probably would have still met, but it would have taken us much 
longer to meet, and having them come to us and engaging [sic]. I would have needed several 
intros and a longer timeframe to get them.” Venture founders at Hickory attended four or 
five mentor meetings per day, repeating their ventures’ pitches each time and accumulating 
feedback from different mentors. A founder of a relatively mature business with $100,000 
per month of revenue and seed funding prior to the program recounted, “The first month was 
intense. We did 54 mentor meetings in the first 30 days, and the main thing I remember is not 
knowing how to simply describe the business, I couldn’t say what it was without needing like 
a half an hour because I didn’t really know what it was.” Ventures were able to conduct 
                                                 
7
 The average number of meetings for the ventures in this study is slightly lower. This could be 
because this study includes ventures from multiple cohorts. 
53 
more mentor meetings because Hickory’s director scheduled meetings and meetings 
happened at Hickory’s office. 
Because meetings were condensed, founders could hold more meetings per day than 
they would have been able to if meetings were not condensed. Rapid feedback led to 
cognitive overload. Interestingly, rather than responding with rigidity or reduced learning 
(Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2004), mentor overload diminished preconceived ideas about which 
business strategy to pursue. Once founders became open to change, they recognized patterns 
among seemingly conflicting mentor feedback. For example, another Hickory venture 
founder recounted a major decision for his venture, whether to sell directly to consumers or 
aggregate data on consumer preferences to sell to other business:  
I would say probably 20 interviews and 20 sessions in, and I did 70 in that month, every 
single person but one had answered the question the same which is you should be a 
data business, and so then we decided alright we are going to be a data business . . . we 
are not going to have these anymore. This is settled. 
Venture founders rarely had time to strategize between meetings, yet their pitches 
evolved during the mentor dating process. As one founder explained, “You started to see 
when something sparked someone’s interest, and so you started to use those phrases more 
often.” Over time, founders moved from confused and overwhelmed to clear and committed. 
She continued, “The more people asked us about it, the more we were able to reject those 
ideas even if they are temporarily rejected. We felt more confident about what we were doing 
and the direction we were headed.” As ventures concluded the mentor dating period, 
founders became intensely committed to their chosen strategy, which enabled them to 
implement more quickly the following month by focusing only on implementing the chosen 
strategy rather than considering alternatives. 
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Hickory ventures delayed implementation during mentor dating. The director said, 
“They got no work done in June” because they were in mentor meetings all day. For most 
ventures, implementation entailed programming to build a software product, Web site, or 
mobile application. The focus of the first month was on altering cognition rather than 
establishing routines. The next month, focus shifted from mentor overload to intense 
implementation as firms learned by doing. 
Alder provides another example of mentor overload. Alder ventures met with an 
average of 75 mentors during the first month of the program and 83% reported receiving 
conflicting advice. Alder directors and associates scheduled mentor meetings for the 
ventures, and those meetings happened at Alder’s office.  
When venture founders arrived at Alder’s offices each morning, they received their 
daily schedule from an Alder associate. Alder associates scheduled five or more mentor 
meetings per day for each venture. Alder’s director described the mentor matching process as 
“semi-structured.”  Ventures could request meetings with mentors and mentors could request 
meetings with ventures, but Alder’s employees did all of the scheduling. 
A venture founder described mentor overload, “the first week is so stressful and 
overwhelming, it’s hard to focus. But you get used to the craziness of the schedule and you 
sleep when you can and do work when you can and try to absorb as much as you possibly 
can while you’re talking to people.” Another founder recalled trying to use “pattern 
matching” to find recurring themes in seemingly conflicting mentor feedback, which helped 
the venture choose a direction.  
The director explained that the goal of the first month was “to work out if what you 
are doing is correct.” A founder explained how mentor meetings helped them gain 
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confidence in their strategy, “We went through a lot of different things. We thought what if 
we had a mobile app? What about it we either did this or did that and we got to where we 
are.  It wasn’t without a lot of steps in between . . . That first month was very painful.”  
Another mentor explained how firms considered outlying feedback until they “understood 
the coalescence” of feedback.   
Mentors helped firms identify interesting new opportunities for the team. For 
example, a mentor told one firm, “With your background you could solve this problem in this 
way and it’s a huge problem. A global, huge, big problem—you have the wherewithal to do 
it.” Forty-eight hours later, the venture pivoted to the new opportunity and was committed to 
it.  
Ventures at Alder delayed implementation during the first month. A director 
explained the evolution of delaying implementation, 
Essentially in month one you spend an awful lot of time externally to your product, 
so, you know people show up, they have this thing they are working on and this vision 
of whatever the product is, and in some ways we try to slow them down in term of the 
amount of time they are spending in front of the computer working on the product 
because [before] people would show up and spend the next three weeks working on 
something and then realize that that's just stupid that I'm spending my time working 
on this midway through. And so rather than have people sort of spend all that time 
going down dead ends we try to slow them down. 
 
Venture founders who failed to delay implementation often had to “scrap” code they 
wrote during the first month.  When ventures delayed implementation, they were more fluid. 
As one venture founder explained, “every two days we were changing our minds about what 
to do but what we ended up with was really compelling.” By delaying implementation, 
venture teams were free to make changes to their business.  
In sum, a diverse and impressive set of mentors provided compressed feedback to 
Alder ventures. A director explained, “We are not saying this is the answer, we are just 
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trying to give them lots of data points . . . there's no one right answer.” Diverse perspectives 
encouraged venture founders to consider many alternatives, and the high status of the 
mentors made it difficult for the founders to dismiss their feedback (Merton, 1968; Podolny 
& Stuart, 1995) without careful consideration. As an Alder director said, “[Mentors] are 
going to force you to gain conviction because they’re going to give you mentor whiplash. 
You’re going to hear one thing from one person, a totally different thing from another 
person.” The ventures’ executive teams had to decide which strategy to pursue, which forced 
communication and decision making among the founding teams who ultimately coalesced 
around the emergent firm strategies.  
Different accelerators provided different types and levels of mentor interaction for 
ventures. Some accelerators assigned mentors to ventures rather than pursuing a dating 
process. My data suggest that accelerators that assigned mentors to ventures accelerated 
learning less than accelerators that arranged meetings and let ventures and mentors 
organically develop relationships. For example, Chestnut is an accelerator where mentor 
overload did not occur. The mentor matching process at Chestnut differed from the process at 
Alder and Hickory. The Chestnut director matched ventures to mentors at the beginning of 
the program. The managing director explained that he assigned mentors so that ventures 
could “get feedback immediately.” Though there was no formal mentor dating period, 
ventures could initiate meetings with other mentors who were listed in a directory.  
Expectations and social norms about the intensity of mentor relationships were also 
different at Chestnut. The director expected mentors to work with two or three companies by 
meeting with them “regularly,” though he did not explicitly describe his expectations to the 
mentors. Ventures in this study each had fewer than 10 mentor meetings during the three-
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month program. Mentor meetings were stretched over the duration of the program, which 
meant that ventures typically met with a mentor every week or two. Ventures were 
responsible for scheduling mentor meetings and meetings most often happened at mentor’s 
offices, thus, learning-coordination costs were considerably higher for ventures at Chestnut.  
Only 33% of Chestnut’s ventures reported receiving conflicting advice. Some 
reported changing directions based on feedback from a single mentor. One venture founder 
recalled,  
At one point someone said you guys should be going into mobile and so, this is the 
craziest thing and we’ll never ever make these mistakes again, but we heard that one 
piece of feedback and we started looking at mobile . . . every 2 weeks we had a new 
project we were building all the way up until Demo Day. 
 
Unlike ventures at Hickory and Adler, who delayed implementation during mentor 
overload, ventures at Chestnut continuously iterated between mentor advice and 
implementation throughout the program. Because they did not delay implementation, the 
ventures at Chestnut shifted strategy while implementing. Sixty-six percent of the firms 
failed shortly after they graduated from the program.  
Mentor overload accelerated learning in several ways: Venture teams adapted their 
collective cognition in response to abundant feedback, venture teams distributed knowledge 
across members because individuals cannot store all of the information, and founding CEOs 
evolved into executives who filter and route knowledge throughout the organization. The 
director at Alder continued to explain the benefit of overloading founders with mentor 
feedback,  
That’s the way the real world works and we’re accelerating that. So your customers 
are going to do it to you; your family is going to do it to you; your investors are going 
to do it to you. Guess what? You’re the entrepreneur and you get to cook, right. 
That’s why you run the company and not us. And you have to be good at 
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communicating and you have to be good at taking all of that input and deciding what 
you want to do. 
 
During the first month, firms “changed directions all the time, it actually happens a 
lot in the first month but I want to get through that.” Alder’s director continued, by the end of 
mentor overload, venture founders had “a lot of conviction about the direction of the arrow 
before they hit the gas.”  
Recent work suggests that founder’s pre-entry knowledge limits strategic options 
(Fern, Cardinal, & O’Neill, 2012; Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2012), yet offers few 
solutions to reduce the constraints of founders’ past experience. Mentor overload might be 
one such solution. Mentor overload breaks down cognitive barriers to considering 
alternatives. Hickory’s director said, “Part of the process is literally breaking them down, 
and getting them to the point where they aren't that arrogant start-up saying, ‘my idea is the 
best idea in the world.’ They realize that there's so much more to it, and that they really only 
have the seed of an idea” Mentor overload provided ample feedback to break momentum and 
reverse course (Senge, 1990), which broadened ventures’ sets of options. Diverse feedback 
led to better solutions (Lapré & Van Wassenhove, 2001).  
When accelerators scheduled meetings for founders, the coordination costs for 
venture founders were negligible, which enabled ventures to meet with more mentors and 
more diverse mentors than when ventures initiated their own meetings. As an Alder venture 
founder wrote on his blog, “It would have taken me three months just to schedule 20% of 
those same meetings.” Locating meetings at the accelerator offices further reduced travel-
related coordination costs for the venture. Venture founders dedicated more time to learning 
(Ocasio, 1997) because they were freed from time-consuming scheduling and networking 
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typically performed by nascent entrepreneurs (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). Thus, by reducing 
learning-coordination costs, venture founders accelerated learning.  
Rather than diminish learning (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), mentor overload reduced 
biases suggested by prior research (Denrell, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levinthal, 
1997). By meeting with many mentors in a short period of time, founders were able to 
distinguish outlying feedback and identify commonalities among seemingly conflicting 
advice (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). For nascent ventures, outlying strategies might be the 
most valuable. Understanding the distribution may also lead to competitive advantage. On 
the other hand, at Chestnut where ventures only met with a few mentors and those meetings 
were not time-compressed, venture founders were unable to distinguish signal from noise and 
prematurely switched from mentor suggestions to implementation. Only after time-
consuming implementation did these ventures realize that the mentor’s advice was poor.  
We might have expected venture founders experiencing mentor overload to fall into 
“failure traps” (Levinthal & March, 1993) when they received conflicting feedback from 
mentors rather than consistent support. When feedback was not time-compressed—for 
example, at Chestnut—ventures experienced failure traps: They continuously built new 
products and iterated until they failed. However, when implementation was delayed and 
interactions with mentors were time-compressed, ventures experienced cognitive overload 
but did not experience failure traps. Time-compressing failure and search and reducing time 
to interpret and implement might reduce the “trap” aspect of repetitive failure.  
Prior work suggests that information overload might lead entrepreneurs to respond 
with mindless action (Feldman & March, 1981). Generally, this work suggests that managers 
respond to information overload by doing the same thing (rigidity) rather than changing. 
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However, most work on organizational cognition is set in existing organizations who are 
experiencing changes to their environments (e.g., Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). The firms in this study were very young and may not be as 
committed to their cognitive frames, especially if they have not converted cognition to 
routines. The firms in this study reacted more consistently with predictions of Simon (1990) 
who suggested that firms develop pattern recognition and extrapolation capabilities to reduce 
cognitive overload. By responding to cognitive overload, ventures reduced seemingly 
conflicting feedback to the core essence of their business—their strategy. 
Another key aspect of mentor overload is delaying implementation. Delaying 
implementation reduced experience bias (Levinthal & March, 1993) and escalation of 
commitment to failing strategies (Staw, 1981). Mentors helped founders eliminate strategies, 
thus reducing the number of strategic choices, avoiding dead ends and focusing learning on 
potentially optimal choices (Levinthal, 1997). Consequentially, ventures identified product 
market fit in a relatively short amount of time. When implementation eventually resumed, it 
was with full commitment to the chosen strategy. As one venture founder said, “it slowed us 
down temporarily, but allowed us to speed up later.” Strategic stabilization enabled faster 
implementation (Lynn et al., 1999).  
Finally, the mentor dating period first legitimized uncertainty and subsequently 
reduced it. Learning that reduced risk, even if it resulted in a new strategy, was celebrated 
rather than avoided. Pre-existing biases, which might ordinarily lead entrepreneurs to “stay 
the course” were quickly eliminated in favor of adaptation.  
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Table 10: Mentor Overload 
Accelerator Avg # 
meetings
8
  
Conflicting 
advice
9
  
Accelerator/  
firm meetings
10
 
Did overload happen?  Was implementation delayed?  Learn 
mentors
11
 
Chestnut <10 33% Low / low  No “Led to way too many changes for me and my 
team.” 
No “Met with our main person twice.” 
No “Asked them to give us advice on very specific 
things.” 
No “Every 2 weeks we had a new project we were 
building on all the way up until Demo Day” 
Yes “It is not until half of the program that we actually 
start demoing the product” 
5.6 
Birch  25–50  100%  Medium/ medium  
 
“Initial meetings 
all happen here.” 
Yes “Felt like drinking water from a fire hose”  
Yes “We got a lot of feedback  . . . Hard to tell what 
was what.”  
Yes “Some people say X, some people say Y and some 
people say A.”  
Yes “Totally conflicting advice.”  
Yes “Hours would go by and you wouldn’t get stuff 
done related to your core business.”  
Yes “It’s ok if you lose a day of coding because the next 
four days of coding are going to be a little more 
structured.”  
4.83 
Oak 12.5 33% Low/ medium  
 
“I just ran around 
Boston like a 
crazy person.” 
No “ It’s very executional, very specific topics . . . 
almost everyone at Oak at this point has already seen 
an opportunity, they’ve shaped what they want to do 
about it and now they’re there actually executing it and 
doing it.”  
Yes “I had them all meet together . . . We came to a 
consensus together.” 
No “I just ran around Boston like a crazy person.” 
No “working on their product” 5 
Ash  <20 100% Low/ low Yes “The first two weeks of it was constant meetings 
with mentors . . . that situation is kind of chaotic and 
my brain was sort of like a bowl of pudding at the end 
of it.” 
Yes “…better for us to hash it out in the meetings with 
the mentor, because we had a third . . . we didn’t have 
time to brew over it . . . we were prepared to move 
forward even when we were not in agreement.” 
Yes “I’d like to make sure you are pointing in the right 
direction before you step on the gas.” 
Yes “Making sure that they are pointing in the right 
direction before we go introducing them to bunch of 
customers or may do other things that they might only 
get one shot at.” 
 
6 
Hickory  63  80%  High/ 
none  
Yes “A lot of feedback, great feedback mediocre 
feedback and informed feedback; was the whole 
gamut.” 
Yes “The clutter that comes from all mentors giving 
you too much advice.” 
Yes “It’s quite overwhelming.” 
Yes “In the short run, like in the first week, it’s totally 
Yes “we want the—that evolution to happen virtually 
without you are having to actually physically go build” 
Yes “It slowed us down temporarily, but allowed us to 
speed up later.” 
Yes “You are inherently out of balance on the strategy 
side.” 
Yes “You are over strategizing and under executing . . . 
5.8 
                                                 
8
 Average number of mentor meetings during first month 
9 
Percentage of venture founder informants reporting receiving conflicting advice  
10
 Assessment of the number of meetings coordinated by the accelerator over the number coordinated by the ventures  
11 
Average response to “Rate amount your firm learned from Mentors” Ratings were provided on a seven-point Likert scale  
  
6
2
 
Accelerator Avg # 
meetings
8
  
Conflicting 
advice
9
  
Accelerator/  
firm meetings
10
 
Did overload happen?  Was implementation delayed?  Learn 
mentors
11
 
confusing and overwhelming but in the long run; they 
come out stronger and smarter.” 
Yes “Get really confused, and then start to narrow 
down the funnel, and get clear on things.” 
you are really way behind on execution.” 
Yes “Very little doing.” 
Yes “They got no work done in June. They were in 
meetings all day.” 
Alder  75  83%  High/ low  Yes “A week into the program, you have no idea at all 
what the f*** your company is doing.”  
Yes “We were really struggling with conflicting advice 
our lead mentors were giving us.” 
Yes “Very wide range of feedback.”  
Yes “Huge feedback that really helped us to learn.”  
Yes “Every two days we were changing our minds 
about what to do.” 
Yes “Very little coding happening at any of the 
companies.”  
Yes “When you do build something in the second month 
. . . ”  
No “I was doing a lot of coding, which I ended up 
having to basically scrap anyway.” 
Yes “Rather than just building, go out and actually ask 
people if they’ll use it first.” 
6.2 
Pine  15  100%  Low/ high  
“I put a lot of 
effort into trying 
to look through the 
entire list, which 
was a bit 
overwhelming.” 
No “They’re not going to understand everything that 
we’re working on.”  
Yes “Half of the people say you need to charge more 
and half the people would say your pricing is just 
right.”  
Yes “Different people, different views—but part of the 
CEO’s job is to get advice and ultimately you have to 
pick your own course.” 
No “We got a ton of stuff done because we were really 
focused.”  
No “They basically just left us alone to go to work.”  
No “And for the next 24 hours, we as a team had to 
sprint to see how we can apply that to our business and 
sometimes make somewhat sweeping changes to our 
business model. The next day, we’d have the next 
mentor and we’d do it again.” 
4 
Fir  5 80% Medium / Low  No ““Look, the mentors are busy. They won’t have 
time to help you unless you’re very specific.” 
No “I, for the most part, didn’t interact a whole lot with 
the mentors.” 
Yes “Conflicting advice is inherently confusing. But 
there was good and consistent advice that we needed to 
just make decisions and move on, even in the face of 
conflicting advice.”  
Yes “Everybody provided conflicting advice.” 
Yes “It seemed like they were trying to get you to do 
something that either conflicts with something that one 
of the other mentor said, or conflicts with your own 
vision.”  
No “We had to spend too much time head-down and not 
enough time in the educational and coaching areas—and 
that decreased our learning.” 
No “Very slowly getting into the meetings with the 
advisors.” 
No “They told us that two months in is the last thing that 
you’ll be at in terms of traction, in terms of product.” 
4.25 
Redwood  5  25%  
 
Low/ high  
 
“Tell them who it 
is that you want to 
meet and they'll 
try to make an 
introduction.” 
No “I can’t think of a time when their advice 
specifically conflicted with each other or consequential 
feedback.”  
Yes “It was confusing.” 
No “And they stay out of the way”  
No “They expect you to spend the first month at home 
alone, writing code.”  
No “We tell them be heads down, focus on making 
something people and then worry about raising 
funding.” 
No “We don’t want 500 different people meeting one of 
the startup once and giving them conflicting advice.” 
 
N/A 
* Reduction in coordination costs are assessed using the ratio of accelerator- initiated meetings over firm-initiated meetings. When the accelerator initiates 
mentor meetings, the firm’s coordination time and costs are reduced 
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4.2. Director Experts  
Extant research has highlighted the challenges of transferring tacit knowledge (Von 
Hippel, 1994; Polanyi, 1966), especially when the receiving firm lacks the organizational 
routines, foundational knowledge, and problem-solving experience required to absorb 
learning (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). However, the nascent ventures in this study learned 
from director experts who accelerated learning by transferring experience to nascent 
ventures. I define director experts as advisors who cumulate and transfer experience to 
nascent ventures.  
Table 11 provides evidence on director experts. I assessed director experts as follows: 
(1) the level of director experience, measured as the number of program alumni; (2) the level 
of program structure, which was coded as “none” when the program had no structure, 
“monthly” when the program had a structured progression that shifted every month, and a 
brief description if the program had another type of structure; (3) the intensity of shaping, 
which I assessed using the average number of times the director provided feedback on each 
venture’s pitch; and (4) the average response to the closed ended question “rate the amount 
learned from the accelerators directors.” Ratings were provided on a seven-point Likert scale. 
Birch provides an example of director experts. There were three co-directors at Birch, 
all with complimentary expertise: One was a venture capitalist, another was a former CEO, 
and the third was an engineer by training. The directors were generally available, with at least 
one in the office most of the time. Although the directors had substantial experience with 
start-ups prior to forming Birch, they also had interacted with over 25 ventures in their role 
as directors of Birch.  
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The directors transferred what worked in the past, so that the ventures could learn 
from the directors’ past experiences without having participated in or directly observed that 
experience. For example, one founder said that the directors shared “examples of other 
people’s pitches and what worked well and what did not,” which helped his venture prepare 
its pitch. Birch’s directors also helped ventures recognize and correct their “fatal flaws.” 
Experience helped directors predict what flaws might become fatal in the future. Identifying 
and discussing fatal flaws began during the application process and continued throughout the 
program. Through director’s past experience, they helped founders identify and reduce risk—
unknown risks became known and defined so that ventures could address them.  
Birch’s program was highly structured. Based on their experience, Birch’s directors 
developed structure that synchronized learning. Structure conveyed what to learn and how 
much time to allocate to each learning assignment. For example, Birch’s directors developed 
the program structure, which included three one-month segments. A director explained, “The 
first month is really focused on product. The second month is more focused on business. And 
third month is focused on market and fundraising.” Not only did the program’s structure 
communicate what ventures needed to learn during each phase of the program, but it also 
communicated how long to spend on each learning assignment. A venture founder explained 
that the directors “set a timeline for when you had to have an initial deck and initial draft [of 
the pitch] ready.” Another founder compared their progress to the program structure, “We’re 
pretty much on track except traction we’re probably about a week behind.” Thus, the 
program’s structure helped ventures determine what they needed to learn, when they needed 
to learn it, and how much time to spend learning about each aspect of their business.  
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Synchronizing learning also reduced knowledge gaps. One founder said, “When you 
start off, you don’t know what you don’t know.” Beginning with the application and 
continuing to the program structure, synchronization reduced “unknown unknowns” to 
unknowns that attracted venture’s attention. For example, the application highlighted 
knowledge gaps and triggered learning for many ventures that searched to find answers to the 
application questions.  
Birch’s directors provided feedback on ventures’ learning. Directors met with venture 
founders two-to-three days per week, or more often when founders requested more help. 
Ventures practiced their pitch twenty to thirty times, and the directors provided feedback to 
the ventures on their practice pitches. The three directors’ feedback and style complemented 
each other. According to a venture founder, “You’d never walk out of a meeting [with the 
finance guy] feeling good about it; he’ll always rip you apart. The tech guy would always tell 
you you’re doing great, and then the CEO guy would be like the pragmatic optimist.” 
Another said, “Cam would play bad cop, he could be very critical of business ideas and 
pitches but in a friendly way.” While critical feedback was difficult for some founders to 
receive, one commented that “it makes you stronger.” Overall, feedback refined and 
confirmed venture learning.  
Hickory provides another example of director experts. Hickory had two full-time 
directors who worked in an open space alongside the venture founders. The two directors are 
serial entrepreneurs, with several startups and successful exits between them. Moreover, 
Hickory had over 25 ventures that graduated. Based on their experience, the directors of 
Hickory were able to spot patterns and intervene to redirect ventures that might be on an 
inferior or failing path. One director commented on a venture’s problems, “I have seen this 
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movie before; it is going to fail because customer acquisition is too expensive.” The director 
also recalled, “We had to do an intervention of sorts but I recognized what was going on 
earlier.” He went on to explain that the venture’s issues reminded him of a venture from the 
previous year, but by the time he had noticed the problems the previous year, it was too close 
to the program’s completion to provide significant help. The second time, the director spotted 
the problem earlier and was able to help the venture correct their course.  
Hickory’s program was highly synchronized. The program was divided into three 
one-month segments: The first month was mentor dating, the second month was mini-MBA, 
and the third was pitch. As discussed earlier, during the first month, ventures met with a 
diverse group of mentors. During the second month, guest speakers lectured on business 
tactics such as marketing, finance, and fundraising. Ventures also spent a significant amount 
of time building their product or service during the second month. During the last month, 
ventures developed and refined the pitch in preparation for Demo Day. Ventures fit learning 
assignments into the allotted time period. One founder said that “knowing we had a month to 
put together a story made us put together a story in a month . . . I don’t think we would have 
done any worse or any better if it was four months.” 
At a more micro level, Hickory directors synchronized learning by providing 
templates, which ventures completed. For example, Hickory directors provided ventures with 
a pitch template. Using the template, ventures focused learning activities to complete each 
part of the template. A director described the pitch template, “If you believe these three 
things: It’s a huge market, I have a low customer acquisition cost, and I can get a lot of 
customers at a profitable rate, you're going to want to invest in my business.” Ventures then 
focused learning on the market size and customer acquisition strategy. Some venture 
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founders said that completing the application highlighted initial knowledge gaps. As one 
founder said, “When filling out the application—I did not even know what I didn’t know!” 
Questions on the application focused venture learning on finding answers to the application 
questions and leveled initial knowledge for ventures prior to the program. 
Toward the end of the program, Hickory directors shaped learning by refining the 
pitch. Venture founders practiced their pitches 100 times—literally. The directors scored the 
ventures’ pitches after each practice. Directors provided critical, if not harsh, feedback. A 
director commented, “We don’t sugarcoat it at all,” and one venture founder reported crying 
during pitch practice. “They would give you somewhere between a zero and a five, and the 
day that I cried I got two, and I had gotten three the day before.” The director further 
explained how he and his partner shaped venture pitches:  
 [My partner] is a master at putting the storyline together for the pitch and making sure it 
flows and make sense, and I'm really good at once we have a storyline, how do we convey 
those messages really well, what are appropriate slides to go with things like you say, and we 
get down to word choice and in the last week is literally tweaking individual words. 
 
Pitches were 10 minutes long, requiring ventures to focus on the most important 
aspects of their business. The process of refining and practicing the pitch helped ventures 
understand the core drivers of their business.  
Ash provides an example of directors that were not experts. Though Ash’s director 
had started several ventures, his accumulated experience through Ash was limited. There 
were 5 ventures per cohort and fewer than 20 firms had graduated from the program. Ash’s 
program was 2 weeks shorter than others, further reducing the cumulated experience of the 
director.  
Ash did not have a formal structure. A venture founder described the program as 
“pretty unstructured.” The director explained,  
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It's not formally broken up, obviously toward the end people are working more of the 
pitches and getting ready for Demo Day and they are probably more focused on 
funding if that what their next step is; but every company is different, so what they 
need is different you know we are not trying to put them into a box we don’t really tell 
them what to do that not really the nature of the relationship. (emphasis added) 
 
Ash’s director began each program session by assessing each venture and trying to 
help them with their unique needs. He explained, “It's different for every company. That 
that’s why this is hard. . . we really spend some time digging in and getting to know them 
understanding, where they are headed, what they need to focus on.” Ash’s director repeatedly 
commented that each venture was unique. In another instance, he said, “What they need is 
different. We are not trying to put them into a box and we don’t really tell them what to do. 
That is not the nature of the relationship. We are here to help them but we try to identify 
people that are self motivated they are going to go out and ask for help and then grab the 
things they need as well.” Ash’s director did not synchronize learning for the ventures. Nor 
did he communicate what ventures should learn or how much time they should spend on each 
aspect of their business. Rather, he provided unique advice to each venture.  
I expected and found that accelerators with smaller cohorts and directors of newer 
accelerators might have accumulated less expertise. However, I expected directors at larger 
accelerators to cumulate more learning. To the contrary, directors at the largest accelerator 
did not synchronize or shape learning as much as the directors of the medium-sized 
accelerators. One explanation could be that the level of interaction between the directors and 
ventures at the largest accelerators was limited. Although hundreds of ventures pass through 
larger programs annually, directors of larger accelerators spread their time across large 
cohorts of ventures, thus they worked less intimately with each venture, which may have 
reduced the amount they learned from each venture. For example, the director at Oak 
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explained how he and his co-director limit their interactions with the ventures, “Our motto is 
not based on us being the bottleneck but on connecting with our resources.” Oak did not 
synchronize learning by dividing programs into monthly topic areas and did not shape 
learning by providing feedback on venture practice pitches.  
Director experts accelerated learning by cumulating experience from participating 
ventures and then transferring their experience to novice entrepreneurs. As one Hickory 
director said, “One of my goals is to expose these guys to all of that stuff—as much of it as I 
can—in 90 days that took me 11 years [to learn].” Because directors simultaneously 
cumulated experience from multiple ventures, they quickly became experts. Directors 
reported seeing “this movie a thousand times,” and founders concurred, “She’s seen this a 
hundred times.” Directors who repetitively helped start-ups from beginning to end could 
predict later experience for less experienced founders who were unable to extrapolate into the 
future. Predicting helped ventures identify future issues and opportunities sooner than 
learning-by-doing did, which advanced learning forward in time and avoided dead ends 
before they were experienced.  
Director experts synchronized learning, which helped firms focus, refine, select and 
time learning experiences. For example, Alder’s director developed the program’s temporal 
structure: “I break the three months in to the following pattern and again this something that 
that we learned, we didn't start this way so this is sort of how it happened naturally but then 
we codified it probably by the third year.” Structured templates such as the one described 
above synchronized learning for nascent ventures (Winter, Szulanski, Ringov, & Jensen, 
2012). Whereas most prior work has examined how organizations, such as franchisors, use 
templates to replicate routines within a single organization (e.g., Winter et al., 2012), 
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accelerators used templates to transfer expertise from the accelerator to participating 
ventures.  
Templates focused founders’ attention on learning rather than discovering what to 
learn because they described what needed to be learned, when it needed to be learned, and 
how long it should take to learn. For example, directors at Hickory and Alder provided 
founders with a template for their pitch that dictated the length of the pitch and told founders 
when to begin preparing. A founder at Alder said that the director led a “‘how to pitch’ 
session and that actually helped guide us a lot as far as how to tell the story of our pitch.” 
Based on the template, founders knew what they need to learn to create their pitch. 
Ordinarily, founders would need to learn the format of the pitch as well as the content. They 
would also need to decide when to begin practicing and how much to practice. Templates 
might be akin to homework assignments that guide student learning. They also may be part 
of what more experienced firms learn as they develop absorptive capacity
12
 (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990).  
Templates might also be an efficient way for experts to transfer heuristics to novices 
who lack absorptive capacity. Incidentally, director experts frequently transferred expert 
heuristics (timing and priority). Heuristics were transferred when accelerator directors 
sequenced and allotted a certain amount of time for different learning activities. For example, 
timing heuristics were transferred when directors allotted a certain amount of time for pitch 
presentations. Timing heuristics also helped ventures maintain forward momentum and 
avoided complexity traps because ventures moved on to the next learning phase at the 
                                                 
12
 Defined as the “ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, 
and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
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indicated time. Because heuristics are simple, they might be more easily transferred to and 
absorbed by novice firms.  
Finally, directors shaped and refine learning by providing direct, “intellectually 
honest” feedback, most often on the venture’s pitch. When director’s feedback was honest 
and direct, it was easier for ventures to interpret. Although positive reinforcement is 
commonly discussed in studies of learning (Van de Ven & Polley, 1992), negative feedback 
might be faster, especially when desired behavior infrequently happens— negative feedback 
avoids waiting for opportunities to give positive feedback.  
Director experts provided frequent feedback on ventures’ pitches. Director feedback 
proxied for that of investors or customers. Receiving proxy feedback from directors was 
faster than receiving feedback from investors or customers, because directors were collocated 
alongside ventures and widely available. Normally, ventures would need to coordinate 
meetings and travel to investor’s offices for each pitch. To solicit customers ventures would 
first need to establish relationships or discover customer acquisition strategies. Proxy 
feedback has lower coordination costs than real feedback. Proxy feedback was used to refine 
ventures’ strategies and the effective communication of those strategies. In contrast to 
mentors who assisted ventures with learning the business landscape, or exploration (March, 
1991), directors assisted ventures with iterative learning around the chosen strategy, or local 
search (Levinthal, 1997; March, 1991; Stuart & Podolny, 1996).  
Overall, directors focused learning for ventures. Beginning with the accelerator 
program application, which focused learning on answering application questions, and 
continuing through the program structure, which directed venture activities throughout the 
program, directors directed what and when ventures learned. Ventures that followed the 
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temporal structure provided by the accelerator directors knew what to work on, how long to 
spend on each phase of development, and what not to work on. Directors also helped venture 
founders select the most promising strategies, either by providing direct feedback or by 
teaching ventures how to validate strategies with customers. Finally, like sculptors, directors 
chiseled away at a venture’s pitch until only the core, the most important strategic points, 
were left, creating a poignant and concise pitch.  
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Table 11: Director Experts  
Accelerator  Experience; alumni size Level of Structure Shaping/ Frequency of pitch Learn MD 
Chestnut  <25 None  12, no score 4.33 
 “Had three companies” 
“It all depends” 
“It really depends on who is available and 
when.” 
“The vertical focus of it was sort of the key.” 
“Interns that would give feedback, Owen 
would give feedback, we have judges 
sometimes—almost all the time actually, 
the other companies would give 
feedback.” 
 
Birch 25–100 Monthly  20-30, no score 5.83 
 “I have been VC for a dozen years. I have 
seen a lot of pitches” 
“We are cognizant . . .  what their fatal 
flaw might be.” 
“They ran a lunch session with examples 
of other people’s pitches.”  
 “It was pretty structured. So the first month 
mentors are more product focused whereas the 
second month their giving you marketing 
distribution strategy and then its meeting a lot of 
investors.” 
“When you start off, you don’t know what you 
don’t know.”  
“You’d never walk out of a meeting 
[with the finance guy] feeling good about 
it; he’ll always rip you apart. The tech 
guy would always tell you you’re doing 
great and then the CEO guy would be 
like the pragmatic optimist.” 
“It makes you stronger.” 
 
Oak  >200 Monthly, flexible  0, as requested 3.83 
 “It’s not like we had a great a great 
background.” 
“We try and work with one hundred and 
twenty-five companies but our model is 
more along the lines of the connector 
model.” 
“The first month is all about getting settled, work 
with your mentors to define your goals, what you 
want out of it and get to know the mentors and 
all the resources or do education sessions. Then, 
it’s time to just work on your business whether 
it’s with your mentor, whether it’s educational. 
As we get toward the final September period  . . . 
getting prepared for more on the pitching side, 
make sure you can present you ideas in coherent 
fashion.”  
“The offer’s open, they can sit down with 
us but again, we don’t want to be the 
bottleneck for the whole 125 companies, 
right. So what we tell them is, practice 
with their mentors.” 
 
Ash  <25 None 12 5 
 “I started angel investing before I ever 
taken any investment.” 
“Over time a mentor can teach you 
wisdom, in the short term a mentor gives 
you shortcuts.” 
“It's not formally broken up.” 
“Every company is different, so what they need 
is different.” 
“boiling it down with the essence of their 
company” 
“hazing ritual” 
 
Hickory 25–100 Monthly 100+, scored 6.2 
  “I have seen this movie before; it is going 
to fail because customer acquisition is too 
expensive” 
"One of the companies, we had to do an 
intervention of sorts but I recognized what 
was going on earlier.” 
 “Because they told us [when to prep for Demo 
Day].” 
“When filling out the application—I did not even 
know what I didn’t know!” 
“Generally the format is: if you believe these 
three things, you're going to invest.” 
 
 
 “We don’t sugarcoat it at all”  
“That was the worst pitch I've ever seen 
in my life . . . here is what you need to 
change.”  
 “I kept getting all this negative feedback; 
I got a score of one.” 
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Accelerator  Experience; alumni size Level of Structure Shaping/ Frequency of pitch Learn MD 
Alder 100–200 Monthly 100+, scored 6.4 
  “She’s seen this a hundred times, so 
there’s nothing special about what you are 
doing. There are formulas and your idea 
can be unique but the process you go 
through with building products, finding -- 
gaining traction and raising money is very 
similar.”  
 “The first couple of weeks we were told to really 
focus on two or three parts of the pitch and just 
really craft that and then stop. But then each 
week we started adding other pieces of it.” 
“I am 100 percent honest with the 
companies. I do not beat around the 
bush.” 
“They were really hard on us.” 
 
Pine <15 None 10, no score 4.33 
  “I’ve seen this movie a thousand times—
you don’t want to do that. And they say, 
‘No, no, no. We should be focusing on this 
or doing that.’ It’s like, ‘All right.’ I can 
tell you exactly what’s going to happen. I 
could probably plot it out on a calendar for 
you.” 
 “It really all depends. Some companies 
fundraise in the beginning, some fundraise in the 
end, some fundraise after the program so it’s 
really hard to say like formulaically or 
programmatically like every company does this 
or that the first week or the first month.” 
 “They have to learn stuff the hard way, 
rather than letting us tell them.” 
“They were there as a resource for us but 
less proactive about forcing their 
expertise and resources upon us.” 
 
 
Fir 5 – 100 3-week, informal 3-5 5.5 
 “There’s a lot of things in starting a 
company that you don’t think of. You end 
up having a million questions about the 
most random things: How much equity do 
you give a person for the CTO, how do 
you hire a contractor, are there forms that 
you need to fill out before speaking with a 
partner, do you need an NDA? Having 
someone on your side that you could ask 
was immensely helpful.” 
“knowing, how to do it better, what’s hot 
and what’s not in the investment 
community” 
“The first three weeks were validating your idea. 
. . . The second three weeks was trying to gain 
traction and then the final four weeks was to 
prepare and seeking funding.” 
“No they do, we really have three sets in it and 
they are all start the same, they all end up the 
same in between, not every company follows off 
the same track.” 
 “Thomas had challenged us repeatedly.” 
“That was the first time he ever smiled at 
me.” 
“By forcing us to question sort of key 
assumptions about the business and the 
product, by pushing back hard on sort of 
things we said that didn’t hold water or 
parts of our pitch that weren’t clear or 
helpful or compelling.” 
 
Redwood >200 Low: 2 interim events 2, more if needed, no score 5.3 
 
 
 “If you have a problem, they’ve probably 
seen it before.” 
“ They’ve done it many times, have your 
standard contracts.” 
 “The batch was so big that they were just 
having a really hard time remembering 
everyone.” 
 “They definitely give you an outline of what the 
demonstration should look like.” 
“Two weeks into it we have Prototype Day . . . 
we found that this is useful just sort of putting a 
stake in the ground and giving people a reason to 
have built something to show.” 
“Demo Day really, really helped to push us 
forward.” 
“The partners were giving real-time 
feedback.” 
“They were pretty blunt.” 
“We got feedback from the Redwood 
partners on our presentation, on the next 
couple of iterations.” 
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4.3. Divided Teams  
Prior work suggests teams that work together on each experience accelerate learning 
(Pisano et al., 2001; Wheelwright & Clark, 1994). For example, surgical teams that trained 
together and whose membership remained stable learned a new cardiac surgical procedure 
more quickly than teams that had more fluid membership (Pisano et al., 2001). In contrast, 
this study found that teams accelerated learning by working independently, rather than 
together on each experience. I define divided teams as teams that do not work together on 
each experience. Table 12 summarizes evidence on divided teams. I assessed divided teams 
by averaging the team size and evaluating the extent to which teams did not work together on 
each experience. The concept of trust repeatedly emerged from the data. Thus, I also assessed 
the level of trust within the team.  
Birch provides an example of divided teams. All of the Birch teams began the 
program working together. For example, cofounders usually began by attended the mentor 
meetings together. When they worked together, teams developed a shared vision for their 
venture and routines for collaborating. Eventually, all of the Birch teams divided work. 
Founders explained that they divided their efforts in response to extreme time pressure and 
demanding schedules required by the accelerator program. Division enabled them to work in 
parallel. One founder explained, “It would be impossible for us both to participate in at least 
the business side, mentor and investor meetings just because there isn’t enough time in the 
day.” 
Several founders explained how they divided work. Commonly, one founder, usually 
the Chief Technology Officer, focused on building the product while the other founder, 
usually the Chief Executive Officer, focused on meeting with mentors. One founder 
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explained, “J worked on building product and I worked on improving the pitch and meeting 
with mentors to get product advice.” Cofounders who divided spread learning across the 
team. For example, chief technology officers started implementation and learning-by-doing 
while CEOs refined learning about the business model. One founder described his 
relationship with his cofounder, 
We’re in constant dialogue. Yesterday we were doing some user experience updates 
and walking through it and we’ve worked together so long at this point that we finish 
each other’s ideas and sentences. We know how each other think and I know how he 
likes to work, so I mapped it out in Photoshop and I then ask him his ideas. 
 
At the same time, teams learned how to integrate independent learning. Some teams 
relied on the CEO to filter and direct knowledge. A CEO said, “I filter . . . I take all the 
things that I think are appropriate like product feedback and I iterate that so if I sit in a 
meeting for half an hour I try to sum it up for him in a minute or two.” Another founder 
described how his team balances working together and apart. At first he said, “We divide and 
conquer executionally. We solve problems either organically in terms of you solve it if you 
discover the problem or if it’s related to something in your purview or it comes top down 
from me . . . It’s pretty rare that five of us sit around the room an try to think of solutions to 
problem.” Yet that founder also said, “When it comes to actually running the business we’re 
pretty collaborative.” Thus some teams developed rather complex working relationships that 
included both division and collaboration.  
Fir provides another example of divided teams. Fir’s program was two weeks shorter 
than most programs. This additional time pressure made it even more difficult for founders to 
be ready for Demo Day. Seventy-five percent of the founders at Fir reported dividing. One 
venture founder explained, “We started trying to solve them together and we realized that the 
divide and conquer is much better for us.” Another founder concurred, “One of us was really 
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focused on the product and the other started really figuring out the company.” Another 
founder’s story confirms that founders divide to learn in parallel, “It’s more trust when we 
come from our areas of expertise. So, I’d say it increased our team productivity pretty 
dramatically as we divide and conquer.” By dividing, each founder built expertise and 
legitimacy in their domain, thus engendering trust from the rest of the team. 
Ventures at Fir reported that the technical experts coded while the business leaders 
continued to meet with mentors and customers, hired new staff, and spoke to the press. 
Toward the end of the program, the business person focused on developing and refining the 
pitch. A founder said,  
[My cofounder] was coding all the time . . . during the first phase of the program, I 
actually went and did some more site visits and some more interviews to kind of check 
to see if we were going in the right direction. During the middle part of the program, 
I did more product work, so UI design and working with contractors to fill holes in 
our technical skillset. And then during toward the end of the program, I definitely was 
focusing on the pitch. 
 
Division evolved during the program as teams discovered trade-offs between learning 
together and dividing. As a venture founder explained, “We started trying to do everything 
together and we realized that the debates and the ways of trying to refine the ideas was 
making our ideas a little bit better but taking a lot longer . . . but when we divided and 
conquered, everything has been executed much more quickly.” Rather than squeeze every bit 
of learning from each experience, ventures that divided learning accelerated learning by 
learning more efficiently.  
When does dividing happen? One founder at Alder explained that they divided “once 
the problem is understood together.”Another founder at Alder said that time pressure 
translated to division for her team, “We started to understand more of what defined our role 
as we got busier.” A founder at Alder described how her team changed over the course of the 
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program, “We started to understand more of what defined our role as we got busier. Because, 
it would have been really hard for us to be at all the same meetings but we really realized 
that even in the first few weeks. So, learning about roles, trusting the cofounders to take care 
of their departments.” 
Founding teams that had or developed trust were able to overcome stress and 
challenges. A founder at Alder said, “There were a couple of times where we got into huge 
fights because Alex felt we had to do one thing and I thought we had to do a different thing 
and we just couldn’t just see eye to eye. But in the end, Alder really helped us figure out 
conflict resolution because at the end of the day, we had to make a decision and we had to be 
a team about it.” This team developed a collective vision and compromised individual 
differences for the benefit of the team. Another Alder team that not develop a collective 
vision broke up after the program. The remaining cofounder said, 
I actually ended up firing my co-founder at the end of the program about three days after 
Alder. It was really unfortunate. One of the big things that he came into Alder with was 
tension around working in education versus corporations and he was very not interested in 
working for corporations. He wanted to make it work for higher education and the deal we 
made was if he could get seven more higher education institutions with the current platform, 
that would be attractive to go to VCs and say look here is the corporate direction, here is a 
higher education. We couldn't go into a funding round where a spread sheet really was not 
profitable. And so he took responsibility for that and then when he was unable to do it that he 
said I don't want to go into corporations. 
 
Thus trust may be a prerequisite for successful division.  
Collective vision may also be a prerequisite for successful division. Through the 
process of jointly attending mentor meetings, cofounders developed collective cognition 
(Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Teams that developed individual rather than collective 
cognitions broke down later. For example, one founder at Fir described his teams’ work style 
as, “divide and conquer that didn’t work.” He continued, “Ultimately, the product that he 
built was different than the vision that I was selling.” The team “butted heads a lot” and 
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ended up disbanding after the program. Interestingly, the cofounders were introduced shortly 
before the accelerator program, as compared to many teams that had previously established 
working relationships. The split was not due to the lack of a business opportunity. After the 
split, one of the cofounders rebuilt and rebranded the company using the same core strategy. 
The new company raised $1.6M in investment capital from a top-tier venture capitalist, 
The closer teams grew, the more collective their vision and cognition also became. 
This shared trust and vision enabled teams to successfully divide implementation and related 
learning. In teams that did not develop trust, division led to unproductive bifurcation rather 
than cohesive parallel learning.  
How did divided teams accelerate learning? Dividing learning optimized internal 
capabilities across team and built transactional memory systems (Argote & Ren, 2012; 
Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003; Wegner, 1987), which enabled team members to learn in 
parallel. Dividing helped teams learn who is good at what, and who knows what. For 
example, a founder at Hickory described how she and her cofounder learned about each other 
by dividing work, “I know his strengths he knows mine, and we both, of course, had to do 
things that we don't always like, but we divide it pretty evenly.” It was through dividing that 
this founder and her cofounder discovered each other’s talents.  
When teams divided, team members simultaneously employed different modes and 
different areas of learning. Dividing increased functional diversity because team members 
typically divided work according to function; for example, technical cofounders coded while 
sales and marketing team members met with potential clients. Yet teams also needed to 
integrate some of what they learned. Integrating learning enhanced learning comprehension 
because founders needed to synthesize what they learned to share it with their team. A team 
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at Redwood explained how they came together after dividing, “So we usually try to like 
separate, think about it on our own and then come together so we benefit from both, solo 
path and then the group thoughts.” 
Dividing teams also improved organizational communication by reducing the 
assumption of shared experience (Stasser & Titus, 1987) and producing constructive dialog, 
which led to deeper learning (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). A founder from Hickory 
explained, “I prepared for meetings, I do meetings all day. Ezra would code it all day, and 
then from probably like 7:00 to 8:30 at 9:00 we brief each other. I do all of my follow up and 
then leave around midnight, and then we start all over again, and that was the—it was 
helpful in that, and we both knew what the other was doing.” A founder at Redwood 
explained how dividing and then coming together expanded learning, “Usually somebody on 
the team will own the problem and spearhead or propose a solution. As a full team, we’ll 
give feedback on whether or not we believe that solution is the right solution.” Another 
founder at Redwood explained how his team usually divided, but when they had a larger 
problem, they came together, “When problems straddle our skill sets, when it’s a future 
decision that really is going to affect schools, R and I sit down and talk about it and think it 
through.” A founder at Pine similarly said “Mostly we divide and conquer; big things, we’d 
do together; We get together and work it out. You know, price point was a great one. We 
duked it out for six hours and I mean there were some strong opinions on every side of it. But 
when we left, we had a new price point and everybody was good with it.” 
Divided cofounders synthesized learning when they communicated key concepts and 
concerns with each other. They further extended learning by asking their cofounders 
questions about what they have learned and what still needs to be learned. Divided teams 
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built internal communication cadence, such as daily or weekly meetings, which further 
enhanced learning (Bingham & Haleblian, 2012). 
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Table 12: Divided Teams 
Accelerator # Founders  Did division emerge?  Did trust emerge?  
Chestnut  2.2  Yes “I just started going to the meetings and filtering the feedback to my team . 
. .  my team focused on doing the work instead of thinking holistically and 
strategically.”  
Complex “We have always divided our work.” Yet “We all went to mentorship 
meetings.”  
Yes “In the beginning we would all go to those meetings together for those 
meetings but it was to the point where my technical co-founder didn’t want any 
distractions and just get in the zone.”  
Yes “We think pretty much alike.”  
Birch  1.67 Yes “Initially we did them together. After a while I took all of them.”  
Yes “It made sense one of us cover almost every meeting.”  
Yes “We decided early on that it would be impossible for us both to participate 
in at least the business side, mentor and investor meetings just because there 
isn’t enough time in the day.” 
Yes “C was still heads down developing and now I was doing a ton of 
meetings.” 
Yes “It’s been a good bonding experience.”  
Yes “We came and actually we got closer. We’d known 
each other in San Francisco; we’d been working together 
for a bit but moving together and spending full time 
together in the office definitely helped that.”  
Oak  2 Yes “Then as new projects and things come up we ask who on the team wants to 
be part of them and then we delegate and then we divide and conquer.”  
Yes “We’re still all really good friends. . . . In our 
situation, because we are all so passionate, we live, 
breathe and eat our social mission.”  
Ash 2 No “We solve problems together, because we have very different backgrounds . 
. . no matter whose problem it is, we will attack it and we can ask quite some 
unexpected questions of each other, which helps brings out, you know, issues 
and problems, or a solution.” 
 
No “Things came to a head, and one of our mentors was 
like, what are you doing? You know, why aren’t you 
charging for this? (excitement) I don’t understand why 
you are not charging for this! And guys are like 
pounding on us, why aren’t you charging for this, you 
are not going know if anybody going . . . and that’s what 
my partner and I argued about, and we didn’t have a 
good way to break the impasse, and that was the biggest 
thing.” 
Hickory  2.4 Yes “Ely and I had a strict division of labor, so I did every single mentor 
meeting, and he did nothing but write code.” 
Yes “He was really great about managing all the mentor relationships, and then 
I have been always the numbers and presentation person or the analysis person, 
so we were able to more evenly divide our responsibilities.” 
Yes “like a brother and sister relationship” 
Yes “Figured out how to work as a team.” 
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Accelerator # Founders  Did division emerge?  Did trust emerge?  
Alder  2.4  Yes “We’ve laid out clearer goals because we knew that we would have to take 
on a lot of responsibility individually as we collaborated together.”  
No “We come together to solve problems.”  
Yes “So we both went to all of the meetings and eventually—after we picked 
our lead mentor, so probably in Week Four or Five—we started figuring out 
which meetings I should go to versus which meetings Alex should go to alone.”  
Yes “Depended; at the beginning, the three founders went the meetings and then 
over time it really depended on peoples’ expertise and what mentor meetings 
were like”  
Yes “It would have been really hard for us to be at all the same meeting. We 
really realized that even in the first few weeks.”  
No “He was very not interested in working for 
corporations, wanted to make it work for higher 
education and the deal we made was if he could get 
seven more higher education institutions with the current 
platform, that would be attractive to go to VCs. . . And 
so he took responsibility for that and then when he was 
unable to do it that was that and he said I don't want to 
pivot into corporations”  
Yes “Learning about roles, trusting the cofounders to 
take care of their departments, so to speak.”  
Pine  2 Complex “Mostly divide and conquer; big things, we’d do together. We’d get 
together and work it out. You know, price point was a great one. We duked it 
out for six hours and I mean there were some strong opinions on every side of it. 
But when we left, we had a new price point and everybody was good with it.”  
Yes “You know, we began to learn to trust one another 
in new ways and we were moving so fast that sometimes 
you had to go blind.”  
Yes “We sort of learned to trust one another making 
those decisions and we couldn’t all fit in the strategic 
position and have all the information at all times.”  
Fir 2.2 Yes “My cofounder would defer.” 
Yes “So, one of us was really focused on the product and the other started really 
figuring out the company.” 
Yes “We started trying to do everything together and we realized that the 
debates and the ways of trying to refine our ideas was making our ideas a little 
bit better but taking a lot longer. But when we divided and conquered 
everything has been executed much more quickly.” 
No “The program was stressful. It placed stress on our 
relationship.” 
No “We butted heads a lot and ended up having different 
areas of the company . . . my cofounder is my ex-
cofounder” 
Yes “When people gel, they move a lot faster with three 
cofounders, but at the same time, it increases the 
likelihood of tension.” 
 
Redwood  
  
2.5 Complex “It depends on the nature of the problem. Usually somebody on the 
team will own the problem and spearhead or propose a solution. As a full team, 
we’ll give feedback on like whether or not we believe that solution is kind of the 
right solution.”  
Yes “It was probably five companies that I talked to every week at dinners and 
my cofounders each had their own five and there wasn’t that much overlap.”  
Yes “It’s really clear who owns what and so Tom gets to make the final call 
when it comes to business development and that’s great and I respect his 
decision and I’ll push on him. But, when I have a different opinion but it’s like, 
you know, it’s just you’re trying to add input and help him make a better 
decision, so, yeah, we do that all the time but it’s never like we’ve ever fought. 
But we discuss directions all the time.”  
Yes “We have our areas that we just take care of ourselves and also areas where 
we come together and solve together.”  
Yes “It’s changed since we’ve been living together and 
working together and spending tons of time together. 
We’re still really, really good friends who can just be 
friends and also really good co-founders who can be 
good co-founders.”  
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4.4. Cohort Peers 
Given that ventures in accelerator programs are under extreme time pressure and 
perceive that they are in direct as well as indirect competition for resources such as external 
funding, mentorship, and director attention, prior literature suggests knowledge flow between 
ventures should be limited (Messick & Mackie, 1989). The ventures within accelerator 
cohorts were rivals and openly competed with one another. Surprisingly, my data suggest 
that ventures also shared significant amounts of knowledge with each other through a 
construct that emerged from the data: cohort peers. Cohort peers is defined as related 
ventures that influence peer aspirations and self-performance evaluations but also help close 
each others’ performance gaps. Unlike industry peers, which have been the focus of extant 
research (e.g., Hu, Blettner, & Bettis, 2011; Kim & Miner, 2007; Zuckerman & Sgourev, 
2006), cohort peers need not be in the same industry.  
Table 13 summarizes this study’s evidence on cohort peers. I assessed cohort peers by 
examining both rival and supportive behavior. I assessed rivalry three ways: (1) the degree of 
openness at the accelerator’s space; (2) the number of days from the start of the program until 
ventures first pitched to the rest of their cohort; (3) the proportion of ventures that reported 
being part of a cohort drove them to work harder. I assessed supportive behavior by 
calculating the percentage of ventures that reported giving or receiving help from another 
cohort member and the average response to the closed ended question, “During the time you 
were in the accelerator, rate the amount your firm learned from your cohort.” Ratings were 
provided on a seven-point Likert scale. 
Alder provides an example of cohort peers that accelerated learning. Each Alder 
cohort included ten to twelve ventures. All of the Alder teams reported working harder 
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because of the rivalry with other ventures in their cohort and founders described the program 
as having “a lot of peer pressure” and “intense.” One founder commented that “the group of 
people around you [. . .] drive you to do more.” A mentor said, “Some of the teams were 
jealous of some of the others.”  
The managing director at Alder fostered rivalry to motivate ventures to work harder. 
She explained, “Because if you see somebody else doing really, really well and working 
really hard and cranking and making tons of progress, you have social pressure to do that 
too.” Rivalry was intentionally constructed—the accelerator was structured to “expose 
progress” made by the ventures. For example, every week, firms identified what they needed 
to accomplish during the following week to “move their company forward.” The next week, 
firms reported their progress to the group and identified their next challenge. Regular updates 
to metrics displayed on a public board further revealed venture progress and fostered rivalry 
as teams competed to show the most progress. Actions that might be considered bragging in 
other contexts were acceptable, even encouraged, at Alder. Alder’s director explained, “We 
publicly surface progress that will put pressure on other teams to execute too.” Even the 
office space was designed to increase pressure. Alder’s office space was cramped and teams 
worked beside each other at long tables. They worked so close together that it was hard to 
distinguish between the teams but easy for teams to monitor each other’s progress.  
Progress was also exposed through weekly pitch practice. Ventures saw each other’s 
pitches develop over the program. They also heard feedback directed toward other ventures 
and provided feedback to each other. Alder’s director said that pitching each other “takes a 
ton of time” but was “very necessary.” She explained, “A lot of the learning comes from 
listening because the same piece of feedback for this company might be the same piece of 
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feedback that you’ll get—and you may hear it a couple of times. As you see it in different 
instances it really starts to hammer home.” Teams not only saw each other’s progress but 
also compared their progress to that of their cohort peers. One founder said, “Depending on 
what stage the companies are in, they’re already raising more money than a lot of us, they 
have more employees than us. So, depending on the stage, there’s definitely some 
comparison.” Ventures compared themselves and raised aspiration levels to match the top 
performers in the cohort.  
Cohort peer relationships were complex. On one hand, firms competed with one 
another and compared their progress, which fostered rivalry and imitative learning. As a 
director at Alder shared, “They see each other’s pitches so they get some ideas on how to do 
things differently than what they’re doing.” In some instances, ventures simply observed how 
cohort peers achieved success. Alder’s director explained, “They lean over each other’s 
shoulders, they give each other tips and advice, they share resources.” Because ventures 
worked in close proximity causal ambiguity was reduced. On the other hand, cohort peers 
also actively helped one another. Alder’s director explained, “They come in thinking that it’s 
competitive and they find out it’s cooperative and they find out they love each other because 
they’re all going through the same stuff. They learn as much from each other as from us.” A 
venture founder explained,  
The vibe is ‘help everyone at all cost’ . . . I received help from so many different 
people . . . they would stop what they were doing, working on their dream idea and 
talk to us . . . certain people in the program had expertise in pricing, certain people 
had expertise in software development. They would stop and talk to us at length about 
that and then we would do the same with others in our areas of expertise. 
 
Akin to pacers in a triathlon race, where leaders set the pace for each event, ventures 
that excelled in different matters set the pace for the cohort. A founder explained, “So certain 
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teams make progress in certain areas faster than others. For us, for example, it was 
fundraising.” The leaders then helped other others in their cohort catch up. Another Alder 
founder explained, “Some companies were really well-prepared for Demo Day and you 
started to see people giving other teams help and advice and even sitting down and working 
their pitch with them.”  
More generally, ventures asked for and received feedback from cohort peers. “We 
would all use each other’s early versions of the software, so you had the built-in feedback 
loop of 50 people in the same room as you.” Feedback from cohort peers was obtained 
quickly and more completely than feedback could normally be obtained from the external 
environment. 
Redwood provides another example of cohort peers. Redwood was a large 
accelerator, with over 80 firms in their last cohort. Redwood’s ventures did not work in 
shared office space. Instead, they frequently lived and worked with their cofounders, 
sometimes alongside founders of other ventures. A founder at Redwood said that “a lot of the 
interaction happened on Facebook.” Even though they did not collocate during the program, 
all of Redwood ventures reported working harder because they were part of a cohort. Eighty 
percent reported giving or receiving help from another venture in their cohort.  
Like Alder, Redwood encouraged rivalry by exposing venture progress. The second 
week of Redwood’s program, venture founders showcased their idea or prototype to their 
cohort. Seeing other venture’s prototypes decreased ventures’ self-performance evaluations. 
As one of Redwood’s directors shared, “People who might come into the program thinking, 
‘Oh, we’re so far along. We’re a little bit more advanced than most people that you fund.’ 
Once they start seeing what the other people are building, they’re kind of like, ‘Oh wait, I’m 
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not as far along as I thought.’” Seeing the other teams’ progress also raised and broadened 
ventures’ aspiration levels. The director continued, “‘This group’s pumping out all these new 
features, I better do the same.’” Another Redwood venture explained the complex cohort 
relationship, “You are really openly competing and also helping each other, it’s very weird, 
it’s a kind of a funny, interesting dynamic. You contribute to the network and when you need 
something from the network, it will contribute back to you.” 
Weekly gatherings offered a regular opportunity to expose progress. As one venture 
founder said, “You want them to do really well but when they do really well, it will make you 
work a little bit harder as well.” Weekly dinners featured extremely distinguished guest 
speakers. Yet several founders commented that the most valuable part of “dinners was 
talking to the other companies.” Normally, entrepreneurship can be lonely. Weekly dinners 
with the accelerator cohort made entrepreneurship more social. A founder explained, “It can 
be very, very lonely and I think just being a part of a group of people that are all doing the 
same thing and going through the same ups and downs. It’s just really like a stabilizing 
force.” 
A week before Demo Day, a dress rehearsal provided another opportunity for social 
calibration and peer learning. Ventures pitched in front of and received feedback from their 
cohort and the program’s directors. Ventures learned from watching each other’s pitches and 
listening to critiques, as a founder told me, “We saw presentations from other companies and 
we saw things that we really liked from those.” Ventures also competed for the coveted first 
and last spot of the Demo Day program. Based on the performance at Rehearsal Day, the 
director bestowed the coveted first and last spots in the Demo Day program on the two best 
ventures. 
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Although Redwood founders described how they learned from cohort peers, many 
founders had difficulty comparing their venture to the rest of their cohort. For example, 
founders answered comparison questions with answers such as, “They are very hard to 
compare, there’s so many different types of companies.” Another founder explained that she 
did make comparisons, but they were specific,  
When you compare something, you're not comparing your overall company. 
You're comparing like specific stuff. Like what's the email you're sending when 
someone signs up for your product? Oh here’s what ours is. And try to like 
compare and make it better. It’s not really like; you don’t expect that very much 
and be like what's better than half of the companies in the batch or something. 
 
The lack of collocation or extremely large cohort size may have attenuated the effect of 
cohort peers.  
Oak is an example of an accelerator where cohort peers did not emerge. Oak was also 
a large accelerator, with over 100 ventures in each cohort. The last cohort was divided into 
four smaller communities, each located in a corner of a vast open office. Ventures in Oak 
chose whether to attend practice pitch sessions, though only one of the ventures in this study 
chose to attend. The other ventures never saw their cohort peer’s pitches during the program. 
Two-thirds of the ventures at Oak reported giving or receiving help from a member of their 
cohort.  
Ventures at Oak reported feeling cooperative with the other ventures. An Oak 
expected to feel competitive with her cohort, “Coming into the program, I always felt that all 
the different teams who were accepted might feel a little bit competitive.” Instead, she found 
the environment not to be competitive. She said, “It was kind of surprising how helpful it was 
to actually have similar teams.”  
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Not only were the teams at Oak less competitive with their cohort peers but they also 
learned less from their cohort peers. A founder commented that “people are supportive but 
because everyone else also has their own business, they’re not as concerned about 
supporting others.” When asked about learning from her cohort, another Oak founder simply 
replied, “I wish I had.”  
In summary, cohort relationships are complex. Cohort peers simultaneously 
motivated and helped ventures to achieve more. Several informants commented on the 
importance of cohort peers. One venture founder said, “Being part of a [cohort] is hard to 
separate from being part of Redwood.” Several accelerator directors agreed. One explained, 
“The most valuable thing of any program I would argue is the cohort working together.”  
At the same time, cohort peer learning was difficult to achieve. Recall that Redwood 
ventures did not work in communal office space. Given their limited contact, it is surprising 
that they learned so much from cohort peers. On the other hand, ventures of Oak learned less 
from cohort peers despite the fact that they shared office space. Simple collocation was not 
sufficient to foster accelerated learning from cohort peers. Neither was collation required.  
How do cohort peers accelerate learning? Regular public updates reduced learning 
coordination costs. Exposing progress through public updates facilitated knowledge 
spillovers between teams, and teams imitated successful strategies. Public updates reduced 
learning-coordination costs by extending transactional memory beyond firm boundaries. 
Ventures knew which firms or founders in the cohort knew what. Thus, when ventures 
needed expertise, they could find it quickly within the cohort.  
Public updates also created rivalry, which motivated ventures because they aspired to 
perform as well as all of the cohort peers. Rather than with industry peers, as prior literature 
 91 
suggests (Greve, 2003), ventures created social reference groups with their accelerator 
cohort. Calibrating against the best firms in their cohort, ventures concurrently downwardly 
adjusted self-assessments and raised aspirations. Also, rather than aspiring along a single 
performance metric, such as accident rates (Baum & Dahlin, 2007) or market share (Greve, 
2003), accelerator ventures compared themselves to multiple ventures on plural performance 
dimensions. In fact, some accelerators selected “pacers” along multiple dimensions to raise 
plural aspiration levels for participating ventures.  
Moreover, rather than attempting to imitate firm-level strategies by observing others 
from a distance, which can lead to incomplete learning (Denrell, 2003), firms in accelerators 
observed the source of their peer’s success, which showed ventures how to achieve similar 
success. Ventures within a cohort had frequent contact, so they observed “how” other firms 
achieve success, including failed strategies that they could then avoid. In some cases, 
ventures simply imitated successful peer strategies. Cohort peers also actively helped 
ventures close performance gaps. Why did cohort peers help each other despite being time-
pressured for their own venture’s progress? It might be because venture founders became 
incredibly close with one another. A mentor from Alder explained,  
It creates a bond, right? It’s like fraternity brothers, maybe it’s like military people in 
a company at war, because of the pressure and the intensity. I just think that there’s a 
pride, there’s an acknowledgement of having gone through that together. Definitely it 
concentrates itself on the people you went through with. But then there’s the 
fraternity of others who have gone through the same program. 
 
Ventures may also have helped to improve their own reputation. As one venture 
founder explained, “You become known for what you can do and help with.” Regardless of 
the motivation, helping solidified ventures’ own leaning.  
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In sum, cohort peers accelerated learning in several ways. Ventures used cohort peers 
as aspriational reference groups. They upwardly adjusted aspiration levels and downwardly 
adjusted self-evaluation, which expanded performance gaps. Cohort peers also helped each 
other close performance gaps, both by knowledge spillovers and through active helping.  
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Table 13: Cohort Peers 
 Rivalry Support 
Accelerator 
Shared 
space  
1st 
Pitch 
cohort  
Work 
harder  Representative quotes  
Give or 
receive 
help 
learn 
cohort  Representative quotes  
Chestnut Yes, but 
individual 
offices 
1st day 100%  Yes “You see all other people in a way really 
hard and obviously puts some peer pressure on 
you.” 
Yes “If you’re surrounding yourself with 
really smart people who are willing to put 
down 90 or 100 hours a week to run your 
company—it’s not an exaggeration—then you 
do it too.” 
66%  5.33 No “The blind leading the blind” 
No “We were all working in these little silos . . . you had to make 
an effort to be social.” 
No “We were all competing with each other.” 
No “We weren’t necessarily able to ask questions.” [about other 
teams pitches] 
Birch  Yes, but 
individual 
offices  
1st day  100%  Yes “You are here at midnight and you’re not 
by yourself.” 
Yes “It was somewhat of a competitive 
dynamic.”  
Yes “Behind the scenes, kind of sizing each 
other up” 
66%  4  Yes “All the CTOs would meet once a week and have a CTO 
roundtable where they could discuss various issues.”  
Yes “I was like, ‘OK, how did you guys run this?’ And then they 
pulled up in their Facebook ad planner and showed me.”  
Yes “The peer group is where you could actually exchange best 
practices in real-time.”  
Oak Yes Never 0% No “I don’t know if it affected our pace so 
much.” 
No “I guess it was kind of surprising how 
helpful it was to actually have similar teams. 
Like, coming into the program, I always felt 
that all the different teams who were accepted 
might feel a little bit competitive.” 
67% 3.67 No “I never saw everybody else’s pitch.”  
No “I wish I had.” [learnt something from my cohort] 
No “People are supportive but because everyone else also has their 
own business, they’re not as concerned about supporting others.” 
Yes “Walk over to someone’s desk and say ‘hey can you take a 
look at this’ . . . you need to take the initiative to foster it.” 
Ash  Yes  1 Yes  Yes “It helps you stay up a little later or try to 
work a little smarter.”  
Yes “Comparing yourself the whole time”  
Yes “‘One of the other companies made a 
sale!’ and everyone is jumping up and down. 
And then you go back to your office and you 
are like damn I got to beat that.” 
Yes  4 Yes “We saw each other make mistakes and we saw each other 
succeed and so there was a lot of, ‘How do you guys do that?’” 
Hickory  Yes  1  80%  Yes “Seeing someone else in the office would 
definitely help me push me to stay.”  
Yes “Competitors for capital for us” 
Yes “We saw things getting done really 
quickly, and we had to do it as well.”  
Yes “There is pressure to move fast in like a 
group environment.” 
Yes “Made us step it up you know some of the 
companies were really amazing.” 
100%  5.4  Yes “You have nine other teams that may have been through it or at 
least can give you impartial advice.”  
Yes “Having people here with all kinds of experience and 
backgrounds. . . We have a room of 40 people; someone knows the 
answer.”  
Yes “We saw how hard it was for them to break into that sector—
we are like we are not touching that with a ten foot pole.”  
Yes “Sal taught me a lot about how to raise money . . . I learned a 
lot about technology development from Jim.”  
Yes “People asked us a lot of questions, a lot of technology 
questions.” 
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 Rivalry Support 
Accelerator 
Shared 
space  
1st 
Pitch 
cohort  
Work 
harder  Representative quotes  
Give or 
receive 
help 
learn 
cohort  Representative quotes  
Pine  Yes  1  33%  Yes “When you see how hard other people are 
working, a bunch of smart people in the room, 
caused us to perform a lot—caused us to 
perform at a higher level.” 
Yes “I mean that sense of competitive just in 
terms of volume but it’s not competitive in 
terms of worrying about someone’s going to 
steal your customers.” 
Yes “Because there is a natural sense of what 
are other people doing and, you know, 
therefore, you what can you get done.” 
 
100%  5.67  Yes “Whenever I make a technology hire, I send them to A.”  
Yes “ I’d do anything for those guys. I think they would also for 
me.”  
Yes “So we tend to learn from other people what they do process-
wise.”  
Yes “You develop relationships with the people who are going 
through all of the exact same problems you are. They can help you, 
they can commiserate with you, and because everyone is doing 
fundamentally different stuff, there is no competition or conflict.”  
Yes “I didn’t realize how much companies would get from each 
other—all of the different stages and how much value that brings— 
some people are further along or have had different businesses 
themselves. They really teach you a lot.”  
Fir Yes 1 60% Yes “There was a huge competitive aspect.” 
Yes “Caused us to perform at a higher level” 
Yes “It was hard to go slow with everybody 
going fast.”  
Yes “Pressure that was mutually reinforcing” 
No “The teams in the cohort were at radically 
different stages of their companies.” 
100% 6 Yes “People we can tap into for different things . . . got us 
connected to the right people on the Android team.” 
Yes “This person sat down with me at a Chipotle one night in 
October and we figured out how to do this.”  
Yes “We had 40 extremely smart individuals that we would bounce 
ideas off of 24/7.” 
Yes “Consult them on a business or a market that they had more 
expertise, mostly informally.” 
Alder Yes 1st day 100% Yes “There’s a lot of peer pressure that’s 
inherent with a program like this. You have a 
lot of motivated people, a fixed timeframe and 
a lot at stake.”  
Yes “You feel like everyone else is working 
harder than you, even though you’re working 
around the clock.” 
Yes “It was a very good friendly competition.” 
Yes “If everyone else was pulling a late night, 
you feel like, ‘Oh, I want to pull a late night, 
too.’”  
100% 5 Yes “We would all use each other’s early versions of the software, 
so you had the built-in feedback loop of 50 people in the same room 
as you.”  
 Yes “So certain teams make progress in certain areas faster than 
others. For us, for example, it was fundraising.”  
Yes “You also saw that some companies that were really well-
prepared for Demo Day giving other teams help and advice and 
even sitting down and working their pitch with them.” 
Yes “The vibe is ‘help everyone at all cost.’” 
Yes “If it’s a technical problem, I can email three of the other 
CTOs.” 
Redwood  No 
“A lot of 
the inter-
action 
happened 
on 
Facebook.
” 
Week 2 100% 
 
Yes “There was a certain amount of 
competition, comparing yourself to your peers 
and you certainly don’t want to be in the last 
company to launch.” 
Yes “Someone shows you a prototype at the 
Redwood dinner on a Tuesday and then the 
next week it's a working product and they've 
already got 500 users. It doesn't get much 
more motivational than that.” 
Yes “You want them to admire what you've 
done.” 
Yes “You're just competing in like a tiny little 
bubble that’s been created for you.” 
Yes “It's a very positive sense of competition.” 
80% 
 
  
5.0  Yes “All of a sudden you have a peer group of about 100 people 
and they are all geniuses, no matter what problem I face there's 
someone in that group who's faced it before and can help me with 
some advice.” 
No “We didn’t really consult other people in our cohort.” 
Yes “We have some weird bug with Internet Explorer 7 our batch 
helped us out with it from our batch mates.” 
Yes “We got blocked on Facebook earlier on because we didn’t 
really understand some of the policies and we were able to get help 
figuring out how we can get unblocked.” 
Yes “We saw presentations from other companies and we saw 
things that we really liked from those.” 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
This study contributes to organizational theory, strategy, and entrepreneurship by 
suggesting how firms accelerate learning. Prior research establishes that firms learn at 
different rates (Argote & Epple, 1990; Argote, 1999; Darr et al., 1995; Dutton & Thomas, 
1984; Lieberman, 1984; Pisano et al., 2001; Reagans et al., 2005), explores which learning 
modes might be faster (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 1994), and suggests how 
organizations might accelerate production-related learning (e.g, Darr et al., 1995; Ittner et al., 
2001; Lapré & Van Wassenhove, 2001). Nonetheless, prior work leaves unanswered 
questions about how to accelerate learning, especially learning unrelated to production and in 
nascent organizations. Leveraging a novel context—accelerators, which accelerate 
organizational learning during gestation—this study addresses this gap. The research setting 
is ventures participating in nine U.S. accelerator programs. Programs span the United States 
and vary in cohort size. Ventures are primarily technology firms and implementation is most 
often software development.  
5.1. Framework: Accelerated Learning  
A primary contribution of this research is the emergent framework for how to 
accelerate learning. First, firms partake in mentor overload, time-compressed engagement 
with external advisors who give conflicting feedback while implementation is delayed. 
Mentor overload accelerates learning by reducing learning-coordination costs, which enables 
ventures to temporally compress learning from numerous external advisors. Accelerators that 
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arranged meetings and brought mentors to the ventures absorbed learning-coordination costs 
for the venture. Indeed, on average, when accelerators scheduled meetings for the ventures, 
ventures had 55 more mentor meetings than when the venture scheduled meetings for 
themselves. When learning-coordination costs are reduced, not only can ventures learn more 
quickly but they may also learn more completely (Stigler, 1961) because time not spent on 
coordination can be redirected toward learning. By the conclusion of mentor overload, 
ventures commit to a strategy (Porter, 1996) and avoid pivoting during implementation 
(Lynn et al., 1999). This contrasts with popular business rhetoric (Ries, 2011), which focuses 
entrepreneurial attention on pivoting rather than committing to strategies. The ventures at the 
top-performing accelerators in this study rarely made significant pivots after mentor 
overload. Instead, most refined existing business ideas by expanding or contracting scope. 
Jointly, mentors provide heterogeneous feedback, which accelerates learning “the business 
environment.” Overall, mentors expand what ventures learn.  
Second, director experts cumulate and then transfer expertise to ventures by 
predicting, synchronizing, and shaping learning. Prior research demonstrates the challenges 
of transferring knowledge (Von Hippel, 1994; Polanyi, 1966) to nascent firms that lack the 
organizational routines, foundational knowledge, and problem-solving experience required to 
absorb learning (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Director experts do just that, though. How? First, 
director experts who have “seen it many times” project future outcomes for ventures. When 
projections are unsatisfactory, ventures change course. Thus director experts help firms “look 
forward” (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) to temporally advance learning. Director experts also 
synchronize learning through templates that they develop based on their direct experience as 
entrepreneurs and indirect experience helping ventures in prior accelerator cohorts. The 
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broadest template is the program structure itself. Programs are divided into sections and 
venture learning is prescribed for each period. Temporal structure maintains forward 
momentum as firms commit to learning from one stage prior to progressing to the next. Last, 
directors shape learning using frequent “intellectually honest” feedback that proxies for 
external stakeholder feedback. Director feedback is more accessible than feedback from 
external stakeholders, such as investors and customers. Much prior work proclaims the merits 
of positive feedback. However, director feedback is often negative. Directors’ honest 
feedback might be less ambiguous and interpreted more quickly than feedback that is strictly 
positive. Further, positive feedback requires the assessor to wait to observe the desired 
behavior, which can be time-consuming, while honest feedback can be delivered anytime. 
Overall, director experts help ventures focus learning.  
Ventures also accelerated learning by dividing teams. Prior work suggests that teams 
accelerate learning by working together as they cumulate expertise (Pisano et al., 2001). This 
study’s data suggests that nascent teams learning novel knowledge accelerate by dividing 
experiences. Some teams began with team members working together. However, when 
strategy stabilized and team members developed shared cognition and trust in one another, 
they divided experiences. For example, technologists began developing products while 
business executives conducted customer interviews, developed customer acquisition 
strategies, and refined business models. Dividing experience rather than sharing it enables 
team-members to learn in parallel, which not only distributes learning across team members 
but also optimizes learning because team members focus on learning related to their area of 
expertise (Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003). Each team member specializes their learning, which 
leads to functional diversity. Functional diversity decreases the assumption of shared 
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experience, which stimulates conversation and crystallizes learning (Stasser & Titus, 1987). 
It also builds an internal communication cadence that enhances learning (Bingham & 
Haleblian, 2012). In sum, dividing learning accelerates learning because team members 
specialize in their area of expertise, which develops diversity and fosters communication.  
Finally, ventures accelerated learning by relating to cohort peers, peer ventures who 
are concurrently rivals and helpers. Although cohort peers are rarely direct competitors, they 
perceive themselves to be in competition for capital, director attention, and reputation. 
Rivalry among cohort peers motivates firms. Although prior work has established the 
importance of performance gaps relative to peers it has focused on industry peer groups and 
has examined performance along one dimension (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998). This 
study suggests that ventures form aspirational peer groups with their cohort-peers, who 
compete in different industries. Ventures in cohorts adjust their aspirations in three ways that 
accelerate learning: (1) Ventures downwardly adjust their self- performance assessment by 
calibrating against cohort peers. Like other entrepreneurs (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 
2006), ventures frequently begin the program with hubris; after all, they were recently 
selected to participate in the accelerator. Calibrating against cohort peers attenuates hubris. 
(2) When ventures see the extreme performance of cohort peers they raise their aspiration 
levels. (3) Rather than creating aspirations along a single performance dimension, ventures in 
accelerators create plural aspirations, affiliated with plural cohort peers.  
Given the high level of rivalry among firms, prior work suggests that knowledge flow 
between ventures should be limited (Messick & Mackie, 1989), but cohort peers routinely 
helped lagging cohort members close performance gaps. Accelerator routines that “expose 
progress,” including weekly public updates, reduce learning-coordination costs between 
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ventures and thus increase spillovers between firms. Cohort peers also actively help their 
peers. In some cases, ventures test products for each other, closing feedback loops. In other 
cases, ventures explicitly share learning. As a venture founder at Birch explained, “The peer 
group is where you could actually exchange best practices in real-time.” Cohort peers 
accelerate learning by instilling rivalry, facilitating for imitation, and actively helping one 
another.  
5.2. Organization Theory  
This study’s primary contribution is to organizational theory. Accelerators accelerate 
learning by minimizing learning-coordination costs associated with learning. Although 
minimizing coordination costs is central to accelerators, it has been largely ignored by extant 
literature. For example, learning curve studies typically begin, at earliest, with the first unit of 
production (e.g., Argote & Epple, 1990; Argote, 1996, 1996; Benkard, 2000; Pisano et al., 
2001; Rapping, 1965). They omit learning and related learning coordination that occurs prior 
to producing the first unit. These antecedents to learning might include scheduling meetings, 
determining factory floor plans, building relationships to solicit feedback, and locating close 
enough to absorb spillovers. Similarly, studies that examine learning during 
internationalization (Bingham et al., 2007; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002) begin with the first entry, assume country entries are readily available to 
provide learning, and omit coordination costs, which might include deciding which countries 
to enter, learning about local customs, selecting partners, or even travel prior to entry. Studies 
on alliances likewise begin with an alliance formation (e. g., Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 
1998; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009) and then assess learning without regard to the costs 
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associated with setting up alliances, including learning associated with deciding whether or 
not to enter an alliance at all.  
Accelerators reduce learning-coordination costs in several ways. Mentor interactions 
are set up by the accelerator, which reduces the amount of time the venture needs to spend on 
networking to meet potential advisors, scheduling meetings, and traveling to and from 
meetings. As a director at Birch said, “We have those people come to you as opposed to you 
going to them. So just travel time across the city is, is a meaningful acceleration.” Directors 
also reduce learning-coordination costs by providing proxy feedback for investors or 
customers. Proxy feedback is faster than learning from direct experience. They also answer a 
wide array of questions or quickly “route” ventures to experts who can answer questions. 
The director at Alder even calls herself a “massive router.” 
Cohort peers also reduce learning costs. Unlike spillovers, which inadvertently leak to 
other ventures via inventor mobility or geographic proximity (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 
2009; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty, 2000; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & 
Henderson, 1993), accelerators encourage spillovers. Frequent interaction and public updates 
announce learning, which can then imitated by cohort peers. Problems are efficiently 
broadcast to a large group of ventures working on similar problems. Ventures quickly 
identify solutions that have worked for cohort peer ventures. Overall, accelerators “reduce 
friction” related to learning and “have all the resources come to them as opposed to knocking 
on every door possible.” 
I also contribute to organization theory by extending work on learning from others 
(e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Bingham & Haleblian, 2012; Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Prior 
work has focused on the firm that is doing the learning. I find that the sources of learning are 
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also important. Ventures in accelerators begin by learning from a diverse group of mentors 
who provide heterogeneous feedback while implementation is delayed. They also learn from 
experienced director experts who transfer cumulated experience to the ventures to jump-start 
learning. Additionally, they learn from cohort peers whose distributed experience helps solve 
tactical problems. Juxtaposing learning from mentors, directors, and cohort peers, a 
framework of learning from others emerges (see Table 14). When conducting lower-order 
learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985), including learning a business landscape, learning from a large 
and diverse group with some relevant experience is preferred. This group does not need to 
have true experts. However, to conduct higher-order learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985), such as 
how to start a business, interacting with a single or small group of extreme experts is 
preferred. Extreme experts cumulate thousands of hours of purposeful experience and then 
transfer learning to nascent ventures. Finally, when solving problems for which there is a 
known solution, such as technical problems, broadcasting the problem to a large group of 
peers and dividing team experience expedites learning.  
 
Table 14: Learning from Others’ Experience  
 
External Advisors Peers 
Distributed expertise 
Mentors 
Expand options 
Cohorts 
Simultaneous options  
Concentrated expertise 
Advisors 
Narrow options  
Divided teams 
Commit to options 
 
This study further contributes to organization theory by expanding the social learning 
and aspiration literatures (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003). First, it introduces cohort 
peers to the literature. Although prior work suggests that organizations compare themselves 
to industry peers (Zuckerman & Sgourev, 2006; Kim & Miner, 2007), this study suggests 
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they also compare themselves to cohort peers. Moreover, this study draws a more nuanced 
picture of aspirations, expanding the emerging but scarce literature that suggests that firms 
form multiple apparitional goals (Hu, 2012). Firms learn from cohort peers both by passive 
observation and by active knowledge exchange. This knowledge transfer efficiently closes 
performance gaps. 
 
Figure 1: Framework for Accelerated Learning  
 
 
 
5.3. Strategy  
This study also contributes to strategic management. Although learning theorists 
purport that learning is diminished when it is temporally compressed (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Levinthal & March, 1981), this study finds the opposite: Learning is enhanced when it 
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simultaneous 
experience 
• Expand 
aspirations  
• Solve problems 
• Divide 
experience 
• Specialize 
learning  
• Commit to 
options 
• Transfer 
distributed 
expertise 
• Delay 
implementatio
n  
• Expand 
options  
• Transfer 
cumulated 
expertise 
• Foreshadow 
future  
• Narrow 
options  Directors Mentors  
Cohorts Teams  
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is temporally compressed. Temporally compressing learning reduces small-sample biases 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). Moreover, ventures that collect substantial amounts of feedback 
are more likely to learn a broader range of the distribution of feedback. Not only will they be 
able to identify the mean feedback but they will also know the variance of feedback. Perhaps 
more important in an entrepreneurial context, increasing feedback also increases the 
probability of identifying outlying feedback, which may lead to extreme performance. 
This study also contributes to strategy by suggesting that firms delay learning-by-
doing rather than beginning with learning-by-doing, as prior work prescribes (Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 1994). Ventures engaging in mentor overload decelerate learning-by-
doing because ventures’ time and attention (Ocasio, 1997) is consumed with mentor 
meetings. One reason for this discrepancy might be that prior research is left truncated 
(Argote, 1999; Yang & Aldrich, 2012), thus may fail to observe delayed implementation that 
happens prior to the study period. Rather than trying alternatives sequentially (Van de Ven & 
Polley, 1992), firms that delay and temporally compress learning decide between a group of 
alternatives, which reduces the negative effects of escalation of commitment to failing 
strategies (Staw, 1981) and experience bias (Levinthal & March, 1993). Venture founders 
receive copious feedback prior to implementation and are able to make foundational strategic 
decisions (Stinchcombe, 1965) based on more knowledge than they would if learning was not 
temporally compressed. Moreover, firms that hear similar messages in a short period of time 
are more likely to act on those messages than firms that hear similar feedback over a longer 
period of time because firms are more likely to forget over time (Argote, 1999). Thus, 
compressing learning avoids forgetting and amplifies learning. 
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Evidence of time-compression economies is important because prior literature 
suggests that time-compression diseconomies provide sustainable advantages to firms with 
more knowledge—competitors cannot compress learning to “catch up” to knowledge leaders 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; March, 1991). If there are also time-compression economies to 
learning, then knowledge stocks might provide long-term advantages only to those firms that 
continue to learn faster than their competitors.  
5.4. Entrepreneurship 
This study makes several contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. It 
contributes to the understanding the origins of absorptive capacity in nascent ventures. 
Research shows that those firms with higher internal R&D capacities developed through 
direct experience (Zahra & George, 2002), are able to retain more external knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). The premise of this research is that firms need basic 
technical understanding before they can absorb more complex technical information garnered 
from external sources such as alliance partners. This study suggests that absorptive capacity 
may begin by reducing unknown unknowns to unknowns that can then be solved. An 
organization might accelerate its initial accumulation of absorptive capacity by following 
templates that structure learning. Prior work on templates highlights the role they play in 
intra-firm transfer, including between franchisers and franchisees (Winter et al., 2012). This 
study shows that templates can also transfer across firm boundaries from experts to nascent 
firms. Templates might seed absorptive capacity by providing initial foundation and 
structure, which accelerates learning in nascent organizations.  
I also contribute to the discussion on lean startups. Discourse on entrepreneurship has 
focused on how firms pivot, or change during gestation (Ries, 2011). However, my data 
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suggest that pivoting might not be as important as this discourse seems to suggest. I found 
evidence that ventures accelerate learning by stabilizing strategy prior to implementation 
rather than pivoting strategy during implementation. Entrepreneurs may want to shift their 
attention away from pivoting toward making strategic commitments.   
This study also extends prior work on learning by entrepreneurial teams (Bingham & 
Davis, 2012), which suggests that entrepreneurial ventures begin learning by observing 
others. More specifically, this study extends prior work by suggesting not only that nascent 
ventures begin by learning vicariously but also that they begin by learning vicariously from a 
large group of heterogeneous external advisors. The large size and diversity of the group 
enhances vicarious learning. Ventures also learn from smaller groups of experts who transfer 
templates, refine learning, and forecast future outcomes. The concentration of expertise is 
particularly important and related to what is learned. Distributed expertise enables 
heterogeneous lower-level learning while concentrated expertise enables homogeneous 
higher-level learning.  
This study also contributes to our understanding of what accelerators are and what 
they do. More broadly, this study contributes to the literature on incubators (Barbero, 
Casillas, Ramos, & Guitar, 2012; Bruneel, Ratinho, Clarysse, & Groen, 2012; Rothaermel & 
Thursby, 2005a, 2005b; Smilor, 1987) and angel investors (Hochberg et al., 2007; Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2010; Hsu, 2007) by explaining the differences between the three forms. 
The defining feature of accelerators is their limited duration, which creates cohorts of 
ventures who start and end programs together. Moreover, accelerators expand social 
interactions for entrepreneurs, enhancing opportunities to learn vicariously.  
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Finally, the findings in this study might help explain serial entrepreneurs’ superior 
performance (Hsu, 2007). Prior work finds that serial entrepreneurs benefit from superior 
networking and social capital. This study might explain how entrepreneurial firms with serial 
founders learn faster. Like director experts, serial entrepreneurs may be better at predicting 
future outcomes, which triggers search when outcomes are below aspirations, creating 
templates to focus initial learning and using temporal structure to maintain forward 
momentum.  
  
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION  
Conceptually, there are two types of learning: learning what to produce and learning 
how to produce it efficiently (Argote, 1999), yet prior work on how to accelerate learning 
focuses narrowly on how to accelerate learning related to production efficiency (Adler & 
Clark, 1991; Argote & Epple, 1990; Benkard, 2000; Ittner et al., 2001; Levin, 2000), leaving 
many unanswered questions about how to accelerate learning. The purpose of this study is to 
suggest how firms accelerate learning. Using an inductive, multiple-case methodology, I 
explored how nascent firms participating in nine U.S. accelerator programs accelerated 
learning.  
The theoretical framework for accelerated learning that emerged from the data 
suggests that learning was accelerated through four constructs: (1) mentor overload—time 
compressed interactions with external advisors that delays implementation; (2) director 
experts who develop and transfer expertise nascent ventures; (3) divided teams—founding 
team members who split up rather than band together during experience accumulation; and 
(4) cohort peers—peer ventures who are concurrently both rivals and supporters.  
This dissertation makes several important contributions. First, it highlights the 
importance of learning-coordination costs, which occur prior to learning engagements. Prior 
work has largely neglected the period prior to learning interactions. Attention to what 
happens prior to learning interactions brings to light the importance of learning-coordination 
costs. Minimizing learning-coordination costs enables learning to be accelerated and 
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temporally compressed. Interestingly, contrary to theoretical predictions that warn against 
time-compressed learning (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Levitt & March, 1988), this study’s data 
suggest that time compression enhances learning. Under time pressure, ventures compared 
strategies simultaneously rather than sequentially, which reduced experience biases. Time 
compression also enabled ventures to learn more, which reduced small-sample biases.  
Second, unlike prior work that suggests that firms begin with “doing” (Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 1994), data from this study suggest that firms delay “doing” until 
strategy emerges and begins to stabilize. Also, although prior work suggests that teams stick 
together as they cumulate experience (Pisano et al., 2001), venture teams in this study 
divided when they learned by “doing.” Dividing experience enabled teams to accelerate 
learning by spreading learning across the team. Each member created specialized knowledge 
in their area of expertise and learned in parallel. Dividing also reduced the assumption of 
shared knowledge (Stasser & Titus, 1987), which enhanced team communication. One reason 
for the contradiction with prior work might be differences in joint team tenure. Prior studies 
examine well-established teams in incumbent firms (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Pisano, 
1994), whereas this study examines nascent teams. Established teams may have divided 
earlier in their tenure and may already have developed specialized knowledge (Levinthal & 
March, 1993), thus they might benefit more from coming together while nascent teams might 
benefit more from specialization enabled through division. More research is needed to 
understand how and when teams should learn together and when they should divide.  
Third, this study extends work on social learning (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
1998). Prior work has found that firms form social reference groups with peer firms in the 
same industry (Zuckerman & Sgourev, 2006). This study suggests that organizations need 
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not be in the same industry to form reference groups. Ventures in the same cohort formed 
aspirational peer groups, even if they were in different industries. Moreover, rather than 
single goals, ventures created portfolios of aspirations. This study also extends work on 
transactional memory systems. Prior work on describes transactive memory systems within 
firm boundaries (Argote & Ren, 2012; Wegner, 1987). Ventures in this study extended 
capabilities and knowledge beyond firm boundaries to the broader cohort. Many ventures 
interviewed employees for each other. Others relied on each other’s specific knowledge. For 
example, a founder at Fir recalled consulting cohort peers, “On a business or a market that 
they had more expertise.” 
Fourth, this dissertation also expands our understanding of vicarious learning and the 
foundations of absorptive capacity. This study suggests that the concentration of expertise 
among focal firms matters. In particular, distributed expertise accelerates lower-order 
learning while concentrated expertise accelerates higher-order learning. In particular, 
directors who cumulated expertise on organizational gestation period were able to transfer 
knowledge to nascent ventures despite the presumably low absorptive capacity of those 
ventures. At accelerators, where the directors had less cumulated expertise, the ventures 
learned more slowly. This study extends prior work that explains the attributes of experts to 
suggest that experts can transfer learning to other organizations—even nascent firms. 
Directors seeded venture learning and absorptive capacity using templates that directed 
learning. Templates communicated what, when, and how to learn.  
Accelerators are quickly proliferating across the globe. This study might have 
implications for accelerators as well as the ventures that participate in them. This study 
explains what accelerators do and compares the relative effectiveness of program 
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components. It also draws comparisons to incubators and angel investors. Unlike incubator 
programs, accelerators are limited in duration and cohorts of firms enter, progress, and exit 
together. Unlike angel investors, accelerators invest in cohorts of firms, which might be a 
better way to invest in early-stage ventures. More research is needed to determine the 
effectiveness of accelerators as an investment vehicle.  
Nevertheless, like others, this study has limitations. Data collection relied on 
retrospective information and assessment provided by informants. Ideally, future work might 
ethnographically observe firms as they participate in an accelerator program. However, this 
study takes a first step in addressing how firms accelerate learning. It is also part of a broader 
stream of research on accelerated learning that deductively examines the framework 
proposed herein. The ventures in this study are primarily technology ventures with short 
development times. Future work is required to test the boundary conditions. For example, 
what adjustments, if any, might firms with longer development times require?  
This study may also have implications for managers in both entrepreneurial and 
established firms who want to accelerate learning. For example, new product development 
managers may consider how to mimic mentor overload in a corporate setting. Customers and 
suppliers might serve as mentors for one another, or managers from different divisions of a 
multi-division firm might serve as mentors. Moreover, larger firms might consider how to 
achieve the benefits of cohort peer relationships amongst internal or external new product 
development teams. One idea might be having teams apply to an internal accelerator 
program, with start and graduation dates. Or, firms might form accelerators with related, non-
competitive firms.  
 111 
 
Additionally, this study contributes to the field of education. First, it suggests that 
temporally compressed educational programs, such as one-year MBA programs, may want to 
consider structuring the program in temporal sequences that synchronize learning across 
cohorts. Moreover, this study suggests that routines that expose progress among student 
cohorts may enhance learning. For example, asking student teams to publically update the 
rest of the class on the progress of final projects might accelerate learning for all teams.  
More specifically, this study is relevant to entrepreneurship educators in universities, 
incubators, and other institutions. Prior work has asked the question, “Can entrepreneurship 
be taught?” Perhaps a better question is, “How can entrepreneurship be taught?” This study 
suggests that the format of entrepreneurship education is particularly important. Highly 
engaged, hands-on development of student businesses that follows a template and leverages 
cohort peers might be an effective means to teach entrepreneurship. Although collocation 
was neither necessary nor required to develop productive cohort peer relationships, regular 
updates that expose progress are essential. Entrepreneurship education might benefit from lab 
sessions where student teams take significant time to update classmates and help each other. 
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APPENDECES 
APPENDIX 1—ACCELERATOR DIRECTOR INTERVIEW GUIDE  
Date:__________________________ Respondent:_____________________ 
Researcher 1:___________________ Title:____________________________ 
Researcher 2:___________________ Company:_______________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION (5 Minutes) 
A. Provide background of researcher 
 
B. Identify the purpose of the research: To understand how accelerators work with young 
firms, and understand what makes some accelerators more effective than others.  
 
C. Describe research involvement: 
 Interview (60-90 minutes) 
 Follow-up emails or phone conversations (if needed) 
 Applicable internal reports or documents 
 
D. Discuss information privacy: All information will remain confidential. Information 
gained from respondents at one interview will not be shared with respondents at another. 
Further, in the write-up, all corporate and individual names will be changed to mask 
identities.  
 
E. Ask permission to begin recording the interview and have informant sign consent form 
agreeing to participate in the study.  
 I’d like to record our conversation so I don’t have to take notes and so I can come 
back to accurately recall our conversation in the future.  
 
F. Outline the flow of the interview. The interview uses both open- and closed-ended 
questions. 
 In the first section, I will ask you short-answer questions about your background 
and your accelerator’s history  
 In the second section, I will ask you to describe the accelerator program. The 
questions are mainly open-ended and will take up the majority of the interview. 
 In the final section, I will ask you a few short answer questions 
 
Depending on your level of involvement with the accelerator, you may not be able to 
answer every question—this is fine. 
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SECTION ONE - OVERVIEW (5 Minutes)  
I’d like to start by asking you a few questions about your background and your accelerator’s 
background. 
 
1.1 Can you briefly tell me the history of your accelerator? (When/why founded (goals), 
changes along the way)  
 
1.2 Can you briefly tell me about your background? Why did you start the accelerator?  
 
1.3 How is your accelerator different from Venture Capital or seed fund? 
 
1.4 How do you measure success? 
 
SECTION TWO—ACCELERATION PROGRAM (45 Minutes) 
PROGRAM  
2 Can you describe your program from application to Demo Day?  
 Can you elaborate on what happens for the each part of the program? (each month 
or phase) 
 Has your program always worked like this? Why/why not? What is the rational for 
running your program this way? What has changed? 
 Is there anything about how your program works that surprised you? What? 
 
2.2 Can you tell me more about the common educational piece of the program? That is, 
educational opportunities for the whole cohort. (if needed . . . dinners, lectures, 
manuals, etc.) Why do you include them when you do? 
 
2.3 How do you think the length of the program affects what firms get out of the program? 
Why? Can you provide an example?  
 
2.4 Compared to firms you have been involved with outside of the accelerator, what get’s 
“accelerated” for firms in the accelerator? Does anything go slower?  
 
2.5 Founders have limited time, no doubt, what should they focus on first? Why? 
 
2.6 In general, how committed are venture founders to their idea when they start?  
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 Do you try getting them to consider alternative ideas?  
 How does that usually happen?  
 In your experience, what’s the most common reason firms decide to pivot? Why 
do some fail to pivot?  
 
COHORT 
2.7 Can you tell me about having firms enter and exit in cohorts?  
a. How do firms interact with their cohort?  
b. How do they benefit from their cohort?  
c. How else does the cohort affect ventures? 
d. Why did you decide to have # firms in a cohort? 
e. What advice might you give to firms about the “cohort” effect?  
f. Did you observe anything interesting or unexpected about firms when they are part of 
a cohort? 
 
VENTURES  
2.8 Tell me more about venture teams.  
a. How do you assess teams? 
b. Do you think team dynamics change – for better or for worse – during the program? 
Why? 
c. When do team dynamics delay a firm?  
d. When do they help speed-up a firm?  
e. In your experience, what do the venture founders think they will get out of 
your program – that is, at a high-level, what are their expectations? 
f. How accurate do you think firms are at self-evaluating the potential of their 
idea? How does their self-evaluation change during the program? How does 
that change during the program? (Note time markers of changes) 
g. Is there an ideal stage of company? What are the pros/cons of being very early 
stage? How about being further along?  
h. In general, how committed are venture founders to their idea when they start?  
 Do you try get them to consider alternative ideas?  
 How does that usually happen?) 
i. Anything surprise you about how teams perform? 
 
2.9 What commitments do firms make during the program? (e.g. Do firms typically hire 
people during the program? Buy equipment? Plan for after the program (like sign a 
lease)?  
 
MENTORS  
 
2.10 Let’s talk about mentors for a few minutes.  
2.10.1 What do you look for when selecting mentors?  
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2.10.2 How many mentors does each venture have? Why?  
2.10.3 How do interactions between founders and mentors happen; are they scheduled 
regularly or ad-hoc? 
2.10.4 Are there particular combinations of mentors that seem to work best? (e.g. venture 
capitalist and entrepreneur, mentors that have worked together in the past)  
2.10.5 What, if any guidance do you give to mentors? When do you give that advice? Do 
you give any other advice?  
2.10.6 Is there anything about the mentorship part of your program that surprised you? 
 
2.11 Tell me more about your personal involvement, along that of your co-founders and 
DMs. Can you provide a few examples of how you help firms? What are the most common 
types of problems you see, and how do you solve them? How do firms meet with you – do 
you schedule in advance, hold open office hours?  
 
2.12 How do firms incorporate customer feedback? Is this different for accelerated firms than non 
accelerated firms? Anything surprise you about how firms have incorporated customer 
feedback?  
 
2.13 If convertible note: What, if anything, changed for firms when you started providing a 
convertible note? (Amount of note:___) 
 
SECTION THREE – Overall Questions  
 
3.1 Overall, what do you hope firms learn by participating in the accelerator? When does this 
happen? What prevents it from happening? 
 
3.2 Think of a successful and less successful firm, how did they differ with regards to 
what they get out of the program?  
 Was the timing of when they honed in on their business model and product 
different?  
 Timing of first sale?  
 Did either pivot? When? 
 Describe both CEOs in a few words? 
 
3.3 Choose a successful firm that participated in your program. How did their product or 
service change during the program? Describe their CEO in 3 – 5 words. Who were 
there mentors? How did the team work together?  
 
3.4 IF TECHSTARS: What does the TechStar Network provide to you?  
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3.5 What is the source of your investment funds – the money that you use to invest in 
ventures and for operations? 
 
3.6 Overall, do you think your accelerator selects good firms, or builds good firms? Can 
you back that up with any evidence? 
 
3.7 Is there anything else that you would like to tell me?  
 
3.8 In order to get a rough idea of your accelerator’s history, can you tell me about your 
previous cohorts?? (entry interview only) 
Year Number of firms 
Number 
Funded 
Number of positive 
exits 
Number 
Disbanded or 
comatose Acquisition IPO 
      
      
      
      
 
I would like to speak to a few firms that participated in your program. Our conversation 
should last 45 – 60 minutes.  
 Can you introduce me to 3 firms that participated in your last cohort that learned a lot 
from the program?  
 Can you introduce me to 3 firms that participated in your last cohort that learned only 
a little from the program?  
 
Can you introduce me to a few mentors that worked with these firms?  
 
Thank you.  
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APPENDIX 2—VENTURE FOUNDER INTERVIEW GUIDE  
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Date: __________________________ Respondent:_____________________ 
Researcher 1:___________________ Title:___________________________ 
Researcher 2:___________________ Company:_______________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION (5 Minutes) 
A. Provide background of researcher 
 
B. Identify the purpose of the research: To understand how accelerators work with young 
firms. 
 
C. Describe research involvement: 
 Interview (45-60 minutes) 
 Follow-up emails or phone conversations (if needed) 
 Applicable internal reports or documents 
 
D. Discuss information privacy: All information will remain confidential. Information 
gained from respondents at one interview will not be shared with respondents at another. 
Further, in the write-up, all corporate and individual names will be changed to mask 
identities.  
 
E. Ask permission to begin recording the interview and have informant sign Human 
Subject’s consent form agreeing to participate in the study. 
 
F. Outline the flow of the interview. The interview has three sections and uses both open 
and closed-ended questions. 
 In the first section, I will ask you short-answer questions about your background 
and your firm’s history  
 In the second section, I will ask you to describe the accelerator program. The 
questions are mainly open-ended and will take up the majority of the interview. 
 In the final section, I will ask you a few short answer questions 
 On some questions I will ask you to be brief, while on others I will ask you to be 
detailed. 
 
Depending on your level of involvement with the accelerator, you may not be able to 
answer every question – this is fine. 
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SECTION ONE - OVERVIEW (5 Minutes)  
1 I’d like to start by asking you a few questions about the background of your company and 
its founders. Please answer briefly as this section should take 5 minutes.  
Please state your name, the name of your business and your cofounder’s names.  
 You Founder 2 Founder 3 
A. What is your title/role?     
B. Gender     
C. Age     
D. Highest educational level/area    
E. Functional expertise     
F. Have you ever started a company before?  
If so, how was it financed?  
What was your role? 
Did it exit? How? (acquired, failed, still 
going) 
   
 
G. Did you move to STATE for the program?  
H. If yc:  
i. Where did you work during the program?  
I. If not YC 
i. Did you work at the accelerator’s space?  
ii. For how long?  
 
 
1.1 Why did you apply to an accelerator? Why did you choose this one?  
 
1.2 Did you consider going directly to an angel or VC? How about an incubator? Why didn’t 
you?  
 
1.3 Think back to when you started the program. On a scale of 1-7, where 7 is the most 
developed, where did you think your business was at the beginning of the accelerator 
program? Knowing what you know now, where do you think it was at the beginning 
of the program? Where do you think it was at the end of the program?  
 
SECTION TWO—ACCELERATION PROGRAM (45 Minutes) 
2 Let’s slow down now. Tell me about ACCELERATOR program, starting with the 
application process. Tell me about each part of the program and then tell me how that 
experience impacted your firm at that time. Some parts may not have had any impact, and 
that’s fine.  
 
Note:  
Accelerator process: when/duration  
How did that impact your firm? 
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2.1 Tell me about the application process. Did you interview in person/Skype? With whom 
and for about how long?  
2.2 Did anything during the application process affect your firm’s strategy or progress?  
2.3 What stage was your product at the time you applied? (idea, prototype, Beta, live, 
revenue) 
2.4 Did anything change for your company during the time in-between being accepted and 
starting the program? What? 
2.5 What happened on the first day of the program?  
 What happened during the first week? (what else) 
 The first month?  
 The second month?  
 The last month? 
2.6 If not YC: Tell me the story about how you meet your mentors? (Mentor Matching 
process/assignment) How many meetings did you have with potential mentors? 
2.7 If YC: Which YC partners did you work with? When? How often? Did anyone else 
give you feedback on your product or business? Who? How many people?  
2.8 When did you get customer feedback? How? 
2.9 Tell me about the evolution of your business – from when you first decided to start a 
business through the end of the accelerator program. (Note time markers) 
iii. When did you first conceive your business idea? (month/year) 
iv. When did you decide to apply to the accelerator? (month/year) 
v. When did you make your first sale? (month/year) 
2.10 When did you first start preparing for Demo Day? Lead me through your 
preparations, the actual day, and the following days or weeks.  
2.11 Think back to the accelerator program, were there any other milestones, or themes 
during the program that we have not discussed?  
2.12 When do you think your firm made the most progress? Why?  
2.13 When do you think your firm learned the most? Why? 
2.14 Tell me about your firm’s progress after the accelerator. I want to hear about 
challenges as well as highlights – tell me both the good and the bad 
2.15 Explain how your relationship with your cofounder(s) changed or developed during 
the program. 
 
2.1 About how many seminars did you attend? From which seminars did you learn the most? 
What did you learn? Which did you learn the least?  
 
2.2 How do you think the program’s length affected what you got out of the program? Why?  
 
2.3 Did the fact that the program is three months affect the strategies you choose? How?  
 
 
COHORT 
2.4 The next set of questions asks about your experience being part of a cohort.  
A. How did you interact with your cohort?  
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B. Do you think being part of a cohort affected your firm’s development? 
How?  
C. Can you give me an example of something you learned from your cohort?  
D. How do you think being part of a cohort affected your pace? 
E. Did being a part of a cohort influence your performance in any other way? 
F. Anything else you think is important to know about being a part of a 
cohort? 
 
MENTORS & ACCELERATOR FOUNDERS  
Get NUMBER of meetings, amount of forced meetings, degree of conflicting 
advice/confusion  
 
2.5 Now, I’m going to ask you about your mentors. (Or founders advisors if YC)  
A. How many mentors/other advisors did you have? What were there 
backgrounds? How did you meet with them?  
B. How did your mentors or accelerator founders help you in each phase of 
the program?  
C. Did their advice ever conflict with each other or with what you thought was 
best for your firm? How often? When? Tell me more about these conflicts, 
and how you resolved them.  
D. What, if anything did you learn from your mentors or accelerator founders? 
E. Did a mentor ever make an introduction for you? Tell me about the first 
introduction; Who made it? How did your conversation go? Did anything 
result from it? Was there a more fruitful introduction? Tell me the story 
about that introduction (Who made it, whom was it to, how did it go, what 
was the result).  
 
TEAM 
2.6 (Speaking to founders/CEO). Describe your leadership style in 3 – 5 words. Describe 
each of your cofounders in 3 – 5 words.  
OR  
(If speaking to other team member). Describe your CEO’s leadership style in 3 – 5 
words. Describe yours in 3 – 5 words. 
 
2.7 Some teams like to solve problems together, while others tend more to divide and 
conquer. How does your team solve problems?  
 
2.8 Some firms think about shutting down, but others don’t. Did you ever think about it? If 
so, why didn’t you? 
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SECTION THREE—Wrap-up/overall (15 Minutes) 
3 I would now like to wrap up with some overall questions.  
 
3.1 Startups use a variety of metrics to monitor their progress. What metrics do you routinely 
monitor? How did you decide on those? Wait for result, and then ask for historical 
performance against those metrics. 
 
3.2 In order to get a rough idea of your history, what have been your firm’s quarterly burn 
rate, revenues, employee count and closed funding since inception? It’s okay if the 
answer is 0. When did you hire your first employee? Annual count, including 
cofounders, after that? When did you make your first sale? (month/year) annual after 
that. When did you raise your first round – friends and family included? Annual after 
that. 
Quarter/Year Burn ($) Sales ($)  Employee count Funding ($)  
     
     
     
     
 
 
3.3 I’d like to ask you about your firms’ innovation, for the product that you were working 
on during the accelerator program … For each statement tell me if you agree if 
disagree -  
 
 
The product that you launched during ACCEL was …  Yes/no 
Far ahead of your original time goals  
Slower than the industry norm  
Much faster than you expected  
Faster than the rest of your cohort’s development time  
At the end of the accelerator program, your opportunity   
Much bigger than you expected?   
Much more radical idea than most start-ups in the 
industry  
 
Much smaller idea than you originally expected  
Much bigger opportunity than the rest of your cohort’s   
At the end of the accelerator program, the quality of your 
product …  
 
Exceeded your original goals  
Exceeded the quality of other startups in the industry   
Was much better than you expected it to be  
Was better than the rest of your cohort’s product quality   
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3.4 On a scale of 1 – 7, where 1 = far short of expectations, 4 = as expected; 7 = far exceeded 
expectations 
Seven point Likert Ranging from 
far short of as far exceeded  
expectations expected expectations  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A. During the time you were in the accelerator …   
B. The progress your firm made …  
  
C. The amount your firm learned from Mentor… 
D. The amount your firm learned from the accelerator founders… 
E. The amount your firm learned from the accelerator’s educational 
seminars... 
F. The amount your firm learned from your cohort... 
G. The amount your firm learned from customers …  
 
H. The amount your firm learned about starting a business that you 
could use to start another business... 
I. The amount your firm learned about this firm’s business model... 
J. The amount your firm learned about this firm’s technology...  
 
K. Overall, the amount your firm learned from the accelerator...   
L. The number of contacts made to your firm by your mentors …  
M. The number of contacts made to your firm by the accelerator 
founders… 
N. The number of contacts made to your firm by your cohort… 
O. Overall, the number of contacts that your firm made … 
P. Overall the quality of the contacts made …  
Q. Overall, the results from introductions made during the program  
 
 
3.5 In your own words, what did your firm learn by participating in the accelerator?  
 
3.6 What would have happened to your venture if you were not accepted? Why?  
 
3.7 To wrap up our conversation about the accelerator program, what advice would you give 
to firms considering applying to one? 
 
3.8 Can you please give me your elevator pitch? 
 
3.9 What did you find most surprising?  
 
3.10 Anything you would change?  
 
THANK YOU!  
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APPENDIX 3—MENTOR INTERVIEW GUIDE  
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Date: __________________________ Respondent:______________________ 
Researcher 1:___________________ Title:____________________________ 
Researcher 2:___________________ Company:_______________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION (5 Minutes) 
A. Provide background of researcher 
 
B. Identify the purpose of the research: To understand how accelerators work with young 
firms. 
 
C. Describe research involvement: 
 Interview (60 minutes) 
 Follow-up emails or phone conversations (if needed) 
 Applicable internal reports or documents 
 
D. Discuss information privacy: All information will remain confidential. Information 
gained from respondents at one interview will not be shared with respondents at another. 
Further, in the write-up, all corporate and individual names will be changed to mask 
identities.  
 
E. Ask permission to begin recording the interview and have informant sign Human 
Subject’s consent form agreeing to participate in the study. 
 
F. Outline the flow of the interview. The interview has three sections and uses both open 
and closed-ended questions. 
 In the first section, I will ask you short-answer questions about your experience.  
 In the second section, I will ask you to describe the accelerator program. The 
questions are mainly open-ended and will take up the majority of the interview. 
 In the final section, I will ask you a few short answer questions. 
 
Depending on your level of involvement with the accelerator, you may not be able to 
answer every question – this is fine. 
  
 124 
SECTION ONE - OVERVIEW (10 Minutes)  
1. I’d like to start by asking you a few questions about your background and the 
background of the firms you’ve mentored. 
 
  
a. What is your primary title/role?   
b. Gender   
c. Highest educational level/subject  
d. What year were you born?   
e. Functional expertise   
f. Prior work history – 
briefly state firm, title, number of years 
 
g. Have you ever started a company?  
If so, how was it financed?  
What happened (acquired, failed, still going, new CEO?)  
What was your role?  
 
h. Have you ever invested in a firm?  
How many deals do you do a year? 
What stage? 
 
i. Do you mentor at any other accelerators? Which ones?  
 
1.2 There are lots of reasons why mentors sign up to mentor at the accelerator. In a few 
words, could you tell me why you mentor? Why do you mentor at this accelerator? 
 
1.3 How are accelerators different from VC? From Angels? From incubators?  
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SECTION TWO – ACCELERATION PROGRAM (45 Minutes) 
In this section, I’m going to ask you questions about the accelerator program. 
Depending on how much time you spend at the accelerator, you may not be able to answer all 
of the questions that’s fine, but please let me know when you are not certain.  
 
PROCESS  
2.1 Tell me about the program. Start by telling me about when you first meet the ventures, 
and then step through each week or month. (Note time markers, ask, about when is 
that?)  
 
For each phase, please tell me about your involvement with the firms. Note which firms 
you interacted with, what advice you gave, and whether or not the firm took your 
advice. You may not have interacted during every phase, that’s fine.  
 
2.1.1 As far as you know, has the accelerator always run that way? Why/why not? 
2.1.2 Is there a part of the program that helps firms more or less than you 
anticipated?  
2.1.3 Is there anything else about accelerator’s program that you think might be 
important to comment on?  
 
2.2 How do you think limiting the program to three months affects what firms get out of 
the program? Why?  
 
2.3 To wrap up our conversation about the program, do you have any comments on how 
the different parts of the program work together? Are there parts that you believe are 
particularly important?  
 
Cohort  
2.4 I’d now like to talk about having firms start and end in cohorts.  
a. Have you noticed anything interesting about how firms interact with their 
cohort?  
b. Do you think they benefit from their cohort? How? 
c. How else does the cohort affect ventures? 
d. What advice might you give to firms about the “cohort” effect?  
e. Did you observe anything interesting or unexpected about firms when they are 
part of a cohort? 
 
2.5 Was there anything else about ACCELERATOR program that you found interesting? 
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Firms  
 
2.6 I’m now going to ask you about the firms that you mentor. First, I’m going to ask you 
a few questions about your mentoring relationship with FIRM A.  
 
Mentoring details  Firm A Firm B Firm C 
# Hours per week did you meet with Firm.  
How did they request to see you? 
   
What was the most important advice you gave to 
firm? 
   
Why was it important?    
Was there any advice that they did not take, that 
you thought was important at the time?  
Why didn’t they take it? 
   
How many Mentors did the firm have, including 
you  
   
 
2.6.1 If you mentor again, would you change your involvement in any way? How? 
 
2.7 Can you tell me about any surprises – firms that you thought would do better than 
they did? Or firms that did better than you expected? 
 
Mentorship 
2.8 How many mentors are at ACCELERATOR? How are they selected? What does 
mentorship mean at ACCELERATOR? How much time do mentors give? How many 
does the typical team meet with?  
 
Now, I’m going to ask a few general questions about your style of mentorship.  
2.9 Some mentors have standard advice that they share with most ventures while other 
mentors give more customized advice What, if any, standardized advice do you give 
(for example, rules of thumb)? How did you come up with that? Can you give me an 
example of customized advice? How did you know that? 
 
2.10 Did ACCELERATOR ever give you guidance about how to give advice? What 
guidance did they give? When? [What types of advice to give, or when to give it] 
 
2.11 How is mentoring in the accelerator different from mentoring firms who aren’t part of 
an accelerator?  
2.12 Have you read Lean Startup? What parts of the methodology does ACCEL use? Are 
there any parts that ACCEL Advises against? Why?  
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a. What role do customers play in the program?  
 
b. How do firms incorporate customer feedback? Is this different for 
accelerated firms than non accelerated firms? Anything surprise you 
about how firms have incorporated customer feedback?  
 
SECTION THREE—Wrap-up (10 Minutes) 
3 I would now like to wrap up with some overall questions. Overall, what do you think 
firms learn by participating in the accelerator?  
3.1 Do you think firms that go through accelerators progress differently from other firms? 
How? 
 
3.2 Some mentors try to accelerate all aspects of business formation, while others 
accelerate some activities, but actually try to decelerate other activities. Do you ever 
tell firms to slow down, not to rush? When and why? (resource acquisition, customer 
acquisition, routines, investments from outsiders)  
 
3.3 To wrap up our conversation about your program, do you have any concluding 
comments about the various parts of the program?  
 
3.4 Is there anything else that you would like to tell me?  
 
 
3.5 Can you provide any of the following documents?  
 Written Program schedule/calendars  
 URLs of blogs  
 Anything else that might be helpful?  
THANK YOU!! 
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